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Preface 
The authors are aware that the topic of this discussion paper is particularly sensitive. Agendas 
between donors and partner countries are not always identical and debates are burdened with 
fears of increasing dependency on (some) donors or reduced overall levels of development 
funding. Yet the paper is intended as a contribution to the debate, in particular the one 
claimed by the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in its article 17c. It thus aspires to live up to 
the very purpose of a discussion paper. However, it does, not intend to design a blueprint for 
cross-country division of labour. Rather, the authors wish to place the discussion in a broader 
context and proceed to show some illustrations of how cross-country division of labour is 
approached by four donor countries and three partner countries. If this can be used as a 
contribution to the ongoing discussion on the implementation of the AAA, we will have 
achieved our aim with this paper.  
This discussion paper is the output of a collaboration by Fundación para las relaciones 
internationals y el diálogo exterior (FRIDE) and Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / 
German Development Institute (DIE) during a visiting fellowship by Nils-Sjard Schulz at DIE 
in Bonn in summer 2009. The paper brings together two work strands that are pursued at DIE 
and at FRIDE independently. On the one hand, the work fits with DIE’s initial thinking on a 
better division of labour in the European Union (EU) (with a perspective on improving aid 
effectiveness). The improvement of EU policy for global development is the theme of a team 
of researchers at DIE, including the author, and also builds on a DIE discussion paper by 
Holger Mürle in 2007 (“Towards a division of labour in European development co-operation: 
operational options“). On the other hand, FRIDE is conducting a multi-case research on the 
principles and practice of a better international division of labour, including specific work on 
how Sweden is conducting its phasing out in five countries (see: http://www.fride.org/ 
section/54/division-of-labour). The contribution by our third colleague, Ondřej Horký of IIR, 
who particularly looked into the Czech case study, coincided with the preparation of his 
visiting fellowship in Bonn. We regard this collaboration as a contribution to improving links 
between our research institutions on European development policy and would hope to build 
on this joint work in the future. 
The authors would like to thank the following persons for their valuable comments on this 
discussion paper at its various stages: Diego Angemi (Ministery of Finance of Malawi), 
Edward Burke (FRIDE), Karin Christiansen (Publish What You Fund), Philip Courtnadge 
(United Nations Development Programme) Liz Higgins (Irish Aid), Joanne McGarry 
(Trocaire), Sally O'Neill (Trocaire), Margarita Puerto Gómez (World Bank), Paul Sherlock 
(Irish Aid), Bernard Wood (Bernard Wood and Associates) and Chhieng Yanara (Council for 
the Devolopment of Cambodia). The final version and any potential errors remain in the 
responsibility of the authors. 
Sven Grimm and Nils-Sjard Schulz Bonn, November 2009 
with Ondřej Horký  
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Summary 
With its inclusion in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) signed in September 2008, division 
of labour (DoL) has become a centrepiece for the aid effectiveness (AE) agenda and the 
donor-partner dialogue on global development policies. Donor dispersion and aid 
fragmentation constitutes one of the central concerns of the aid effectiveness agenda, as 
uncoordinated donor approaches and project proliferation overburden the partner countries’ 
capacities, create high transaction costs for the recipient country, duplicate efforts and impede 
transparency and predictability of aid flows. Thus, within its broader bid for harmonisation, 
the Paris Declaration claims for “a pragmatic approach to the division of labour and burden 
sharing [that] increases complementarity and can reduce transaction costs” (§33). 
The European Code of Conduct on Division of Labour and Complementarity (CoC) was 
approved in May 2007 and has since become a flagship in the strive for a common European 
development policy. It distinguishes three levels of complementarity: (a) in-country 
complementarity, (b) cross-country division of labour, and finally (c) cross-sector 
complementarity. Previous versions of the CoC also discussed vertical (between regional, 
national and international levels) and cross-modality division of labour issues. 
Despite the challenge of harmonisation of donors at country level, donors apparently focus on 
cross-sector division of labour, before turning to the supposedly “more political” discussion 
about which partnership should be ended altogether. For its part, cross-country (later dubbed 
international) division of labour still constitutes an open chapter in the negotiations between 
donors and partners at the global level. One of the central problems for pursuing international 
division of labour relates to the complications of embedding donor concentration in the 
partnership paradigm promoted by global development policies. 
Given this conceptual tension between sovereign decisions and international commitments for 
aid effectiveness, two dimensions of international division of labour need to be addressed in 
the near future: (1) Criteria for donor concentration and (2) Phasing-out practices. The lack of 
tangible conceptual and methodological advances with respect to both the criteria and the 
practices poses crucial challenges for embedding international division of labour in the 
broader context of the aid effectiveness agenda. In the context of a greater thrust towards 
concentration of donor efforts, criteria for concentration have strong potential for enhancing 
the dialogue of donors and partners on international division of labour. 
The Accra Agenda for Action – as a Paris Declaration follow-up agreement - locates 
international division of labour within the donor-partner dialogue on global development 
policies. The German and Ugandan-led task team on division of labour hosted at the Working 
Party on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Practices  (WP-EFF) is encouraged to facilitate this 
dialogue by proposing an objective format as well as by promoting analytical work. 
Challenges reflect the inevitable shift from the exclusive concentration on technical issues 
(such as tools and methodologies) towards political processes of renegotiating aid within a 
system of global governance that is shifting gears. 
Looking into the criteria for donor-led concentration (among and beyond EU donors), one has 
to consider at least three levels: first, how does the donor relate to the development and aid 
effectiveness agenda overall? Secondly, a look at the past practice might give hints about 
 Sven Grimm / Nils-Sjard Schulz 
2 German Development Institut / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
donors’ decision making procedures with regard to geographical concentration in the context 
of increased development financing. And thirdly, the differentiation between formal (official) 
criteria and informal (policy-process-driven or depending on political constellations or others) 
criteria will have to made. 
For the discussion on partner country selection from the donor perspective, this paper looks at 
four donor countries, namely Germany, Ireland, Sweden and the Czech Republic. The donor 
cases indicate the following: 
— All donors appear to be grappling with selection criteria and rationalisation of their 
partner country setup. There is an understanding of the need to explain partner country 
selection as a basic function of domestic accountability. Formal criteria are established 
by all four cases against which to measure the partner country selection. 
— Donor governments tend to draw on rankings by both multilateral and private 
organisations. Parameters such as the UNDP Human Development Index and the 
achievement in terms of Millennium Development Goals are most prominent, while 
Sweden used a broad range of formal selection criteria, including analysis from 
Transparency International and the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
— Self-assessment of the actual and potential contribution of a donor constitutes a 
recurrent criterion in all four cases, using different parameters ranging from the 
presence of an embassy (Czech Republic) to an overall added value in the development 
process (Sweden). In none of the cases were linkages made to independent or official 
assessments of donor performances; the evaluation of this aspect was based on internal 
considerations. 
— In all cases, political considerations can trump formal selection criteria. This is 
irrespective of how formal the selection process is, whether it is linked to “objective” 
indicators (as in the case of Sweden) or whether a weighting of different indicators has 
been introduced (as in the case of the Czech Republic). Partner country selection is 
pursued as a clearly political task and process, linked to overall policy considerations – 
be it foreign policy (where do we have special linkages we can/should build on) or 
ideological considerations of partners’ priorities (where do we have fundamental 
agreement in values).   
— In none of the cases indicated have there been signs of structured consultation among 
donors (within the EU or beyond); partner country selection and thus geographical aid 
allocation seems to be considered solely a sovereign and unilateral decision of donors, 
while there is also a lack of consultation platforms for the concentration processes. 
Thus, in practice, the concentration process is looking “inwards” and not towards the 
concentration among donors across countries. 
— Very little – if any – dialogue has taken place with the partner countries, which 
consequently tend to be unaware of the ongoing concentration processes at the donor 
end of the development partnership. One remarkable contradiction needs to be flagged: 
all donor countries express the “demand” for their aid as a key element for why they 
engage in a partner country. But only in the case of Sweden is there experience in early 
information of partner countries (announcing the inclusion in a list of countries eligible 
for Swedish phase-out).  
— In none of the cases have reductions of the number of partner countries explicitly been 
linked to reductions in aid volumes. At least in a pre-economic crisis world, a 
concentration appears to be driven by concerns about effectiveness and visibility of 
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programmes rather than in the explicit context of downscaling of aid. 
Partner countries, for their matter, and in general terms, have not yet engaged in geographical 
donor concentration processes. The selection of country cases includes three country cases in 
more detail: Cambodia, Malawi and Uganda, while a fourth case, Mauritania, is explained 
briefly. What can be derived from country-led processes is the following: 
— Thus far, even very committed partner countries have been adopting a rather prudent 
approach towards international division of labour for several reasons. Among these, the 
lack of consistent progress in in-country division of labour, the donor-driven character 
of division of labour, the fear of losing development funding, the sensitivity of aid as 
central part of foreign relations, and the desire to manage diversity can be highlighted. 
However, even LDCs such as Cambodia and Malawi are already affected by phasing 
out as part of ongoing geographical concentration processes of donors such as Canada, 
Sweden and UK. This exemplifies the urgent need of partner countries to overcome 
their rather passive role in the face of phasing-out at the country level and position 
themselves in a more structured dialogue with the donors at the global level. 
— In all cases, clear criteria have emerged from the national context of promoting donor 
harmonisation in general and in-country division of labour in particular. Thus, a clear 
connection between in-country and international division of labour seems more than 
plausible for partner countries. Financial weight of a donor is a minor variable. What 
matters for aid-dependent partner countries is the modality rather than the volume. In 
this sense, Malawi and Uganda have expressed their clear preference for general budget 
support. More relevance is given to qualitative criteria, which are especially explicit 
regarding the capacities and commitment of donors to perform in accordance to the 
partnership paradigm reflected in the Paris Declaration and the AAA. One essential 
common parameter is found in the actual commitment to the aid effectiveness agenda, 
particularly regarding aid coordination, budget support and alignment (use of country 
systems). Apart from more operational issues such as staffing and expertise, also 
“softer” faculties such as trust, risk-taking, dialogue skills and credibility are essential 
for partner countries to assess donors’ performance. 
— In all cases donors are assessed against aspects related to aid delivery and partnership 
relations, but broader dimensions, such as policy coherence for development (PCD), do 
not yet form part of the reflections on the comparative advantages of donors. The case 
of Cambodia shows that PCD could become more important in the future, especially in 
view of the growing desire of partner countries to end aid dependency. 
— In none of the cases did partner countries use comparative assessments of donor 
countries’ performance. Available data, such as the Commitment to Development Index 
of the Center for Global Development, the donor performance in the monitoring 
surveys on the Paris Declaration or the World Bank Governance Indicators were not 
used. 
— Consultation and mutual learning among partner countries has not taken place so far, 
limiting the capacity to analyse and review the broader (cross-country) processes of 
donor concentration. This applies also to the countries participating in the EU Fast 
Track Initiative on Division of Labour. 
— While the debate on in-country division of labour is generally embedded in a more or 
less clear policy environment, international donor complementarity is still not addressed 
in a structured way at the country level. The lack of strategic orientations and dialogue 
platforms for discussing and analysing the geographical concentration of donors thus 
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far seems to restrict severely the engagement of partner countries in the international 
division of labour. 
With an eye toward the donor-partner dialogue requested by the AAA, the following 
preliminary recommendations arise from the mapping and analysis of criteria for international 
division of labour: 
— Peer learning on criteria for international division of labour is a pending task for 
partner countries. In a first step it is paramount to foster the perspectives of partner 
countries on possible variables for donor deployment. In accordance to the overall 
dynamic of the implementation of the AAA, country experience and perspectives 
should be at the forefront of the efforts on international division of labour. Specifically, 
country-level workshops using creative tools could build scenarios for donor selection 
(see also section 5.1). Furthermore, partner countries could discuss and share their 
criteria at the regional level and promote South-South learning regarding international 
division of labour (for example, through existing Community of Practices). In this 
context, existing indices should be further adapted and guided towards standards for 
donor performance and practice. In sum, these tasks should contribute to a clear partner 
country perspective on international division of labour with the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) task team as the only platform thus far available for 
assessing and taking decisions on geographic donor deployment.  
— Communication among donors also has a wide margin for improvement and should 
be enhanced at the European and DAC level. Information and analysis of ongoing 
concentration processes in different donor countries, such as Canada, Sweden and the 
UK should be disseminated transparently in order to draw a clear image of the shifting 
distribution of donors across developing countries. Mutual learning and peer review of 
donor-led criteria for geographical concentration could be fostered within the task team 
on division of labour at the DAC. 
— The use of criteria for the donor-partner dialogue on international division of labour 
should create synergies with the emerging international mutual accountability and its 
various “mirrors” of mutual assessment. Especially the assessment of donor 
contributions should be strengthened in the multilateral arena. Given that aid 
effectiveness (and overall aid quality) is one of the core priorities for partner countries, 
a comparative analysis of the donor data of the Paris Declaration monitoring survey 
might be an interesting point of entry. 
— In order to ensure a consistent and equitable debate on this broader dimension of 
division of labour, the donor-partner dialogue should be pursued in coordination 
between the DAC task team and the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) at the UN 
Economic and Social Council ECOSOC. Specifically, both the task team technical 
meeting in Paris (in November 2009) the task team kick-off workshop in Pretoria (in 
February 2010) should take into account the results and recommendations of the High-
Level Symposium on Mutual Accountability of the DCF (on 11-13 November 2009). 
The shift of platforms would benefit from a pragmatic, non-exclusive approach of 
merging the task team’s technical capacities and DCF’s political legitimacy, for 
example by including DCF representatives actively in the task team work. 
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1 Introduction 
With its inclusion in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) signed in September 2008, division 
of labour (DoL) has become a centrepiece for the aid effectiveness (AE) agenda and the 
donor-partner dialogue on global development policies. Already claimed by the 2005 Paris 
Declaration, country-led donor complementarity might help to avoid costly fragmentation. 
Donors are thus invited to concentrate their efforts on the basis of comparative advantages to 
be identified jointly in a partner country-led process. While in previous stages, DoL was 
operationalised within the European Union’s construction of common development policies, 
particularly through the 2007 Code of Conduct, today its debate has been uplifted to the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) level, where a Germany and Uganda-led task 
team is addressing DoL within the fourfold Accra mandate (§ 17a-d). Cross-country (later 
dubbed international) DoL represents a particularly sensitive dimension of further donors’ 
complementarity and geographical aid allocation. 
The dynamic of the AE agenda and the provisions of the AAA require that quick progress be 
made towards a “dialogue on international division of labour across countries” (§ 17c), 
“ensuring that new arrangements (…) will not result in individual developing countries 
receiving less aid” (§ 17a). The DAC task team is encouraged to facilitate this process by?? 
proposing an objective and format for this dialogue. Today, there is still a tension between 
partner country selection as part of a donor’s sovereign foreign policy, on the one hand, and 
the partnership commitments on joint decision-making, on the other. Furthermore, on the 
partner country side, international DoL is still regarded with great scepticism since it is at 
times perceived as a risk for losing development funding and as a foremost donor-driven 
process lacking of commonly agreed criteria. 
The task team highlights the need for “further analytic work on cross country division of 
labour” which could identify “challenges for an effective and efficient cross-country division 
of labour” (WP-EFF 2009). Analytical exercises on aid fragmentation (such as the 2008 
Survey of Aid Allocation Policies and Indicative Forward Spending Plans provided by the 
DAC) still merely focus on financial data. There is still a need for developing more 
qualitative, even explorative criteria for donors’ re-deployment, which also takes into 
consideration partner countries’ perspectives and experiences. 
This discussion paper responds to the challenge of promoting a donor-partner dialogue on 
cross-country division of labour by reviewing and analysing qualitative criteria used in donor 
concentration processes and emerging from country-led division of labour. It thus aims to 
create an input to the horizontal discussions between donors and partners on not only 
efficient, but also equitable and partnership-friendly cross-country donor complementarity. 
2 Localising international division of labour in the aid effectiveness agenda 
Donor dispersion and aid fragmentation constitutes one of the central concerns of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. Uncoordinated donor approaches and project proliferation overburden 
the partner countries’ capacities, create high transaction costs for the recipient country, 
duplicate efforts and impede transparency and predictability of aid flows (cf. e.g. Roodman 
2006; Knack / Rahman 2004; Acharbya et al. 2004). Already in the late 1990s, harmonisation 
among donors was understood as a necessary input for a strengthened country leadership over 
 Sven Grimm / Nils-Sjard Schulz 
 German Development Institut / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 6 
the design and implementation of development policies and thus a more effective 
development cooperation (cf. e.g. DAC 1996; World Bank 2001). Further developed in the 
2003 Rome Declaration and guiding principles of the Development Assistance Committee of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC) (DAC 2003a), 
harmonisation and its operational tools (such as pool funding, programme-based modalities or 
delegated cooperation) became one of the five pillars of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness in 2005. Since then, rationalisation of donor activities is measured with the 
degree of programme-based aid and the coordination of missions and analytical work, and 
accordingly assessed in the monitoring of the implementation of the Paris Declaration (cf. 
DAC 2008a; 2008b; 2008c). 
Within this broader bid for harmonisation, the Paris Declaration claims for “a pragmatic 
approach to the division of labour and burden sharing [that] increases complementarity and 
can reduce transaction costs” (§33). The Paris Declaration also introduces comparative 
advantages, identified on the basis of “clear views” provided by the partner countries (§34), as 
a guiding map towards a more consistent complementarity among donors. Previously, the 
DAC had highlighted the need for further specialisation and focus after detecting high sector 
and cross-country fragmentation in its peer reviews on donors such as Sweden (2000) and 
Germany (2001). 
Further light on division of labour was shed by the Code of Conduct on Complementarity and 
Division of Labour (CoC), launched in May 2007 during the German EU presidency (see Box 
1; and Mürle [2007] on conceptual and operational dimensions). Soon to become a flagship of 
the strive for a common European development policy, the CoC distinguishes three levels of 
complementarity: 
(a) In-country complementarity refers to the concentration of each donor in a limited number 
of sectors at the country level. Specifically, each European donor commits to focus on 
three sectors in each country, while each sector should not receive aid from more than five 
EU donors.  
(b) Cross-country division of labour rationalises the deployment of donors at the international 
level and addresses the issue of “orphan countries” (see below). The EU donors agreed to 
increase their focus on the respective priority countries.  
(c) Finally, cross-sector complementarity aims to reallocate aid flows on the basis of thematic 
specialisation of donors that should emerge from self-assessment exercises.  
In previous versions of the CoC, also vertical (between regional, national and international 
levels) and cross-modalities, division of labour was discussed. However, European efforts 
have been directed mainly at the in-country dimension of division of labour, particularly 
through an implementation tool kit (EU 2009) and the Fast Track Initiative on Division of 
Labour, which, launched in December 2007, currently involves 32 partner countries (EU 
2008). 
Despite the challenge of harmonisation of donors at country level, donors apparently focus on 
cross-sector division of labour, before turning to the supposedly “more political” discussion 
about which partnership should be ended altogether. Theoretically speaking, it would appear 
more rational to reduce the number of donors before cross-sector division of labour, as a 
smaller number of donors would lower transaction costs, arguably mostly for the donors that  
International division of labour – Towards a criteria-led process?  
German Development Institut / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 7
Box 1: The EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development 
 Policy 
The content of the Code of Conduct and its underlying rationale is presented by the Commission on its 
website as follows: 
“The Code of Conduct defines the operational principles of complementarity in the field of development 
cooperation. In the absence of an internationally recognised definition of complementarity, the Commission 
defines it as the optimal division of labour between various actors in order to achieve optimum use of human 
and financial resources. This implies that each actor focuses its assistance on areas where it can add most 
value, given what others are doing. […] 
The Code of Conduct is […]: 
focused on operational complementarity (concerning the working methods), in-country, cross-country and 
cross-sector. 
The Code proposes broad guidelines which establish the principles of complementarity in development aid. 
In particular, the Code consists of eleven guiding principles: 
- concentrate the activities on a limited number of national sectors (focal sectors). EU donors should 
confine their assistance in a partner country to two sectors in which they offer the best comparative 
advantage, as recognised by the government of the partner country and the other donors. Apart from these 
two sectors, donors can provide budget support and finance programmes relating to civil society, research 
and education; 
- redeploy into other activities in-country (non-focal sectors). As regards the non-focal sectors, donors 
should either remain committed through a delegated cooperation/partnership agreement redeploy the 
resources becoming available in general budget support or exit from the sector in a responsible manner; 
- encourage the establishment, in each priority sector, of a lead donorship arrangement responsible for 
coordination between all the donors in the sector, with a view to reducing the transaction costs;  
- encourage the establishment of delegated cooperation/partnership arrangements through which a donor 
has the power to act on behalf of other donors concerning the administration of funds and dialogue with 
the partner government on the policy to be implemented in the sector concerned;  
- ensure appropriate support in the strategic sectors. At least one donor should be actively involved in each 
sector considered relevant for poverty reduction. In addition, there should be a maximum of three to five 
active donors for each sector;  
- replicate this division of labour at regional level through the application of the principles of the in-country 
division of labour in cooperation with the partner regional bodies;  
- designate a limited number of priority countries for each donor through dialogue within the EU;  
- grant adequate funding to the countries which are overlooked as far as aid is concerned and which are 
often fragile countries whose stabilisation would have positive repercussions for the region as a whole; 
- analyse and expand areas of strength: the EU donors should deepen the evaluations of their comparative 
advantages with a view to greater specialisation;  
- pursue progress on other aspects of complementarity, such as its vertical and cross-modality/instruments 
dimensions;  
- deepen the reforms of the aid systems: the changes suggested by the Code require reforms of a structural 
nature and in terms of human resources.” 
“Finally, the Commission stresses that, to improve complementarity between the EU donors, it is necessary 
to: 
• learn from good practices of certain national initiatives to improve the division of labour; 
• guide the decisions by means of a clear political mandate since development cooperation is 
 based on political decisions; 
• establish appropriate operational modalities as complementarity is very much linked to how 
 donors organise themselves in the planning, programming and implementation of development 
 cooperation; 
• have a pragmatic approach to implementation that is based on rational, transparent working 
 methods aiming at concrete results; 
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• build effective monitoring systems, such as those of the Development Assistance Committee 
 (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and - at 
 European level - the EU Donor Atlas and the annual reporting on implementation.” 
Key terms are defined on the Commissions website as: 
- “In-country complementarity: ensure balanced funding between all the sectors, transcending their political 
interest. 
- Cross-country complementarity: ensure that the EU has an overall, more regular presence in all the 
developing countries, by correcting the current imbalance arising from the fact that too many donors 
concentrate their efforts on certain efficient countries, often disregarding fragile countries.  
- Cross-sector complementarity: the EU as a whole should provide a complete "tool box" of thematic and 
sector development operations, building on the specific expertise of its members.” 
Source: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r 
13003_en.htm (own emphasis) 
are already seriously engaging in harmonisation endeavours. However, there are apparently 
different rationales at work here: one aspiring for greater aid effectiveness (advocating a 
reduction of the number of partner countries) and one arguing more from a foreign policy 
rationale (maintaining a large number of partners in the world).  
For its part, cross-country (later dubbed international) division of labour still constitutes an 
open chapter in the negotiations between donors and partners at the global level. The current 
patterns of geographic donor deployment illustrate shortcomings at the structural level of the 
international aid architecture. The concern over fragmentation, repeatedly expressed by the 
DAC, arises from the perception that a too thin spreading of resources might limit the impact 
of an individual donor’s aid programme in a specific country and raises institutional and 
organisational transaction costs. A second line of arguing in favour of a more rational donor 
concentration across the globe refers to the existence of so-called “donor darlings” and 
“orphan countries”. The former usually host large groupings of donors, in contrast to the latter 
which are receiving relatively small amounts of aid in comparison to their needs, mostly 
stemming from weak national capacities and state fragility. The concept of “orphanhood” still 
lacks consensus among development actors (WP-EFF 2009). It seems to be essential to 
address the needs of countries receiving aid flows which are insufficient for covering their 
needs, such as Guinea, Nigeria, Uzbekistan or Yemen (DAC 2007). This, however, ignores 
other revenue of states to address national poverty, such as large oil revenue (as in the case of 
Nigeria) or other natural resources. Revising possibly excessive aid allocation to so-called 
“donor darlings” such as Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania or Vietnam should not be seen in 
direct interaction with increased ODA flows to the orphans, but still requires a more 
comprehensive approach of how donors engage individually and collectively. 
While the diagnosis (fragmentation) is already made, the antidote (concentration) is still to be 
developed. One of the central problems for pursuing international division of labour consists 
in the complications of embedding donor concentration in the partnership paradigm promoted 
by the global development policies. The aid effectiveness agenda is inspired by partner 
country leadership and mutual accountability, aiming to generate rules, standards and 
practices on the basis of an increasingly horizontal interaction between donors and developing 
countries (Meyer / Schulz 2008). Thus far, individual donors pursue geographical 
concentration of their aid in most cases without consulting other donors and even less their 
partners. Here a possible tension appears since partner country selection is an inherent part of 
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a donor’s sovereign foreign policy and thus an a priori legitimate unilateral decision, which 
nevertheless conflicts with partnership commitments endorsed at the international level. 
Given this conceptual tension between sovereign decisions and international commitments for 
aid effectiveness, two dimensions of international division of labour need to be addressed in 
the near future: 
Criteria for donor concentration: One possible key for integrating decision-making of 
international division of labour into the partnership paradigm can be found in the 
establishment of criteria for donor deployment among partner countries. Recent DAC efforts 
assessing aid fragmentation in quantitative terms find that country programmable aid for 38 
partner countries came from 25 or more DAC and multilateral donors, while in another 38 
countries received aid from fewer than 10 donors (DAC 2008d). While these data clarify the 
financial dimension, the analytical basis for international division of labour is still very fragile 
in the realm of more qualitative approaches. Within the EU, some work has started on 
identifying their respective comparative advantages; the Commission reported on six 
countries where such assessments have taken place. Two more were said to follow and other 
EU states update their country-level assessments. The picture, however, remains patchy – and 
these are “voluntary and independent processes” by EU member states and “are taking place 
without an EU dialogue” (EU Commission 2009a, 10). And, as the Commission’s 
communication further flags, “..there is a need to dispel the fear that division of labour will 
be imposed by donors, regardless of partner country opinion” (ibid., 12). This arguably 
requires transparent decision-making and early communication. As this discussion paper 
describes, in recent years some donors have identified and applied a series of criteria related, 
for example, to poverty reduction, governance or their own added value. A number of 
straightforward partner country listings can be found such as the World Bank’s Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) or other indices on the quality of governance and 
state fragility (cf. Mata / Ziaja 2009). Yet the question of “value for money” (or donors’ 
added value) is still to be explored from the perspective of the partner countries. Partner 
country consideration is likely to be based also on the consideration of how donors and 
multilateral agencies give aid, not just how much. Though, as reflected in section 5, some 
developing countries are already defining comparative advantages especially at the in-country 
level, for example in terms of actual commitment to aid effectiveness and capabilities for real 
partnership, such as dialogue skills and trust. Thus far, however, experience with donor 
rankings has only been timid, such as the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) or the 
Humanitarian Response Index.1 A large proportion of the difference in the CDI can apparently 
be explained by the donor’s internal governance (cf. Faust 2007). So who gives aid also links 
to the question of how, i.e. how much and how reliable these partners are in promoting 
development. 
Phasing-out practices: Although international division of labour refers to donor 
concentration, very scarce attention has been paid so far to phasing-out as a natural 
consequence of the implementation of a greater country focus. As indicated above, donor 
concentration tends to be pursued in a rather unilateral way, with previous partner countries 
                                                 
1  Among these, the Commitment to Development Index (CDI), published annually by the Center for Global 
Development, and, in the area of humanitarian action, the Humanitarian Response Index prepared annually 
by DARA International. Unranked comparative perspectives on donors practices are available in OECD: 
Managing Aid – Practices of DAC Member Countries, Paris, 2009. 
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being confronted with a donor’s exit as a fait accompli and often having a limited capacity to 
adapt the phasing-out of a donor to the national development processes. There are doubts that 
these practices are coherent with the partnership paradigm, especially in its principles on 
country leadership (such as capacities for planning development and coordinating aid) as well 
as mutual accountability (such as predictability and sustainability), even though, as stated 
above, they are sovereign decisions of donors. The question remains on how the 
implementation of this decision is managed (Schulz 2009a). Far from being an opportunity for 
partner countries, current phasing-out practices seem to undermine national capacities. In this 
line, an evaluation on 14 exit experiences, jointly conducted by four Nordic+ donors, found 
that “good and careful monitoring of exits is extremely rare“ (Jerve / Slob 2008a) and the 
“consequences [of a bad exit management] for people and institutions involved were severe, 
in some cases even disastrous” (Jerve / Slob 2008b, 13). A closer look at the partnership-
friendliness of a donor’s exit from a previous partner seems especially sensitive in aid-
dependent countries. 
The lack of tangible conceptual and methodological advances in both the criteria and the 
practices poses crucial challenges on embedding international division of labour in the 
broader context of the aid effectiveness agenda. While some donors (such as Sweden, see 
below) are already implementing a quick concentration process while maintaining aid levels, 
others (such as Ireland, see below) might reconsider their geographic deployment in midst of 
a stark deterioration of the domestic public finances. The interaction of international division 
of labour and the global turmoil can be twofold: geographic concentration could be boosted 
by the financial constraints with the decrease of ODA leading to the reduced number of 
partner countries. On the other hand, aid cuts could also become more readily explainable on 
the basis of a previous concentration process. Although actors such as the European 
Commission recently highlighted the need for ensuring effective aid in times of crisis (cf. EU 
Commission 2009b), future decisions on donor concentration might actually refer to more 
clear-cut foreign policy interests than to partnerships commitments. 
In the context of more thrust towards concentration of donor efforts, criteria for this 
concentration entail a very important potential for enhancing the dialogue of donors and 
partners on international division of labour. This document will address the gap between 
commitment and practice by mapping criteria used by donors for greater geographic focus and 
emerging from partner countries interested in organising donors’ activities around their 
development priorities. As the following section shows, there is an immediate mandate for 
donors and partners to engage in a dialogue on international division of labour which requires 
a sound basis to which this discussion paper aims to contribute with an exploratory look into 
possible criteria for donor concentration among partner countries. 
3 The Accra mandate: towards donor-partner dialogue 
In the run-up to and during the negotiations of the Accra High-Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness in September 2008, division of labour formed part of the European donors’ 
agenda and was particularly promoted by Germany as a co-chair (together with Uganda) of 
the thematic roundtable on harmonisation. The debate in Accra focussed on in-country 
division of labour and its operational tools, such as donor mappings (DAC 2008e), lead donor 
arrangements (DAC 2008. f.) and legal harmonisation (DAC 2008g). Furthermore, eight 
International Good Practice Principles on Country-Led Division of Labour and Com-
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plementarity were discussed and after endorsement in the recent WP-EFF meeting (DAC 
2009a) will guide in-country complementarity. 
Nevertheless, the international level of donor concentration was finally included in the Accra 
Agenda for Action (AAA). This Paris Declaration follow-up agreement locates international 
division of labour within the donor-partner dialogue on global development policies. The 
provisions of the AAA require that quick progress be made towards “start[ing] dialogue on 
international division of labour across countries by June 2009” (§ 17c). This mandate is 
among the very few time-bound commitments in the AAA, which reflects both the European 
push for geographical concentration and the wish of partner countries to ensure that future 
donor deployment is based on a global dialogue instead of unilateral decisions only. 
Box 2:  Division of labour in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) 
The inclusion of division of labour in the AAA stemmed from a strong bid of the European donors for 
increased concentration. But also partner countries pushed for country-led division of labour in the 
negotiations during the High-Level Forum in Accra in September 2008. 
Among the key issues addressed by the Accra roundtable on harmonisation (facilitated by Germany and 
Uganda), the delegates debated instruments for implementing in-country division of labour, such as donor 
mappings, lead donor arrangements and good practice principles. Less attention was paid to cross-country 
division of labour, although partner country representatives highlighted the need to ensure funding levels in 
each country and expressed their fear to be excluded from a process of high relevance for the aid relations at 
the global, regional and country level. 
As a result of the negotiations, the AAA conceptualises division of labour as a mechanism for reducing costly 
fragmentation of aid and promoting more effective and inclusive partnerships for development. 
Concretely, article 17 of the AAA claims for an improved “complementarity of donors’ efforts and the 
division of labour among donors, including through improved allocation of resources within sectors, within 
countries, and across countries.” The following measures have been agreed: 
“a) Developing countries will lead in determining the optimal roles of donors in supporting their 
development efforts at national, regional and sectoral levels. Donors will respect developing countries’ 
priorities, ensuring that new arrangements on the division of labour will not result in individual 
developing countries receiving less aid.  
b) Donors and developing countries will work together with the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness to 
complete good practice principles on country-led division of labour. To that end, they will elaborate 
plans to ensure the maximum coordination of development co-operation. We will evaluate progress in 
implementation starting in 2009. 
c) We will start dialogue on international division of labour across countries by June 2009 
d) We will work to address the issue of countries that receive insufficient aid.” 
Source: Accra Agenda for Action, September 2008.  
Here, it is important to highlight that the debate and decision-making on donor concentration 
will have to take into account a shift of platforms. Division of labour was initially impulsed in 
the context of the DAC peer reviews and gained traction as a flagship of the European Union, 
both platforms which are composed exclusively of donors. With the integration of 
international division of labour in the AAA, the debate and decision-making on international 
division of labour has been uplifted to the DAC level and in particular to the WP-EFF, where 
“more effective and inclusive partnerships for development” (as one of the three components 
of the AAA) are to be reinforced at the global level. The recent “democratisation” of the WP-
EFF (with donors and partners participating in parity) reflects vividly the more equal 
decision-making at the global level (Schulz 2009b). 
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The Germany and Uganda-led task team on division of labour hosted at the WP-EFF is 
encouraged to facilitate this dialogue proposing an objective and format as well as promoting 
analytical work (WP-EFF 2009). But fulfilling the AAA mandate still encounters several 
challenges. Firstly, the planned dialogue is not yet based on an agreed mechanism for 
debating and deciding on international division of labour. Secondly, partner countries usually 
see geographical donor concentration with great scepticism since it is at times perceived as a 
risk for losing development funding.2 Finally, a general reluctance of partners arises from the 
donor-driven character of division of labour which does not address sufficiently partner 
priorities, for example regarding further alignment and use of national systems. 
In sum, these challenges reflect the inevitable shift from the exclusive concentration on 
technical issues (such as tools and methodologies) towards political processes of renegotiating 
aid within a global governance shifting gears. The need for a criteria-led process is evident in 
face of the current barriers to the donor-partner dialogue and even reinforced by the fact that 
these barriers will not prevent donors from concentrating further. In order to embed 
international division of labour into the broader aid effectiveness agenda and its partnership 
paradigm, such a process could guide towards the inclusion of the perspectives and interests 
of both donors and partner countries. This is where the following two sections of this 
discussion paper intend to shed light with a quick mapping of already existing criteria for 
donor- and country-led concentration. 
4 Criteria for donor-led concentration 
4.1 Methodological considerations 
Cross-country division of labour has been part of donor policies since the late 1990s and 
become especially relevant as a key recommendation emerging from the DAC peer reviews. 
However, communication and mutual learning among donors on geographical concentration 
have been very low thus far, leading to more or less disconnected processes. One possible 
exception is the EU Code of Conduct, with which EU donors have committed themselves 
politically to a better division of labour. However, the non-binding character of the Code of 
Conduct implies that its implementation is particularly dependent on the overall policy 
direction of the respective EU donor, as also acknowledged (or probably rather: deplored) by 
the EU Commission (EU Commission 2009a, 10). 
In this sense, when we look into the criteria for donor-led concentration (among and beyond 
EU donors), we will thus have to consider at least three levels: first, how does the donor relate 
to the development and aid effectiveness agenda overall? If the donor administration aspires 
to lead on the topic of aid effectiveness and the international commitments of the Paris 
Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, the starting point for a structured and 
partnership-friendly process might be more promising than in a case of only reluctantly 
following the agenda.  
                                                 
2  This is mirrored in the claim by the AAA that donors should ensure that “that new arrangements (…) will 
not result in individual developing countries receiving less aid” (§ 17a) 
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Secondly, a look at the past practice might give us hints about donors’ decision making 
procedures with regard to geographical concentration, in general in the context of increased 
development financing. Donors will either have reduced the numbers of partner countries or 
increased them. Thus, official documents will give some clear explanation on why the 
respective partner countries were chosen and what are the criteria for cooperating with these 
countries.  
In a third step, we will have to differentiate, however, between formal (official) criteria and 
informal (policy-process-driven or depending on political constellations or others) criteria. A 
good example of a partner selection process clearly based on formal criteria might be the US 
Millennium Challenge Account (see Box 3), which, however, is only a part of the US 
development assistance programme. The informal criteria help to integrate a certain scope of 
discretion facilitating the final political decision-making process. For this discussion paper, 
the informal criteria are interpretations by the authors of this study, informed by knowledge of 
country systems and/or background discussions with actors in the respective administrations 
or research communities. This is supposed to be a discussion paper in the very sense of the 
word, i.e. we would hope to trigger and inform discussions.  
4.2 Case study donor countries 
For the discussion on partner country selection from the donor perspective, we chose four 
donor countries, namely Germany, Ireland, Sweden and the Czech Republic. Focussing on 
donor concentration, other cases might also have been of interest. Within the EU, and besides 
the cases chosen, Belgium has also reduced the number of partner countries from 25 to 18 in 
2005 and Luxemburg has withdrawn from two countries, and is planning to withdraw from a 
further six. In the Netherlands, phasing out is ongoing for seven countries (EU Commission 
2009a, 10). The European Commission, for its part, is not geographically concentrating its 
aid; it claims that its broad geographical coverage is one of its comparative advantages over 
numerous EU member states. Concentration efforts by the Commission are thus only 
considering in-country, cross-sector division of labour.  
The selection of case study donor countries for this discussion paper looks at the EU system, 
i.e. donor countries from the EU. It includes the biggest bilateral European donor (Germany), 
while Sweden and Ireland are among the donors considered to be particularly progressive 
(being part of the Nordic+ Group). The Czech Republic was included to illustrate the case of 
a (re)emerging donor that is not (yet) a DAC member, but aspires to apply DAC standards 
and is committed to EU development policies. 
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Box 3:  Formal criteria for partner selection in the US Millennium Challenge Account 
Arguably one of the most structured ways of partner selection can be found in the US American Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC). Established in 2004 under the Presidency of George W. Bush, the MCA aims 
to “work with the poorest countries in the world […] MCC is based on the principle that aid is most effective 
when it reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in people.  MCC’s mission is to 
reduce global poverty through the promotion of sustainable economic growth.”3  
The MCC works with clear criteria for eligibility of partner countries. 75% of the MCC’s funds each year have 
to be attributed to Low Income Countries, 25% can go to lower middle-income countries. Eligibility of 
countries is assessed in three areas: (i) ruling justly, (ii) investing in people, and (iii) economic freedom. For 
these three areas, 16 indicators are chosen which are taken from various existing sources, such as data by the 
World Bank Institute, Freedom House, World Health Organisation, United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At least three of the five 
indicators under “investing in people” have to be met to qualify for MCC aid, and the candidate country has to 
be above median in at least half the indicators under each of the three categories. The indicator of control of 
corruption is a “killer indicator”, i.e. underperformance in this regard leads to exclusion from MCC eligibility. 
Countries must also be eligible according to other US legislation, i.e. countries against which sanctions are 
decided cannot qualify.4 
The MCC serves as a good illustration of a clearly criteria-led process. This, however, comes with 
weaknesses: the countries eligible under the MCC are not necessarily the most needy countries, but will have 
to have a certain baseline performance. The programme points to its high commitment to alignment: the 
content of the compact between MCC and the partner country is drawn up by the partner country itself.  
Yet, as clear as the general selection criteria for country eligibility are, the assessment of the concept note was 
not clear to countries from the outset and appears to be a problem for some. The insecurity and capacity 
limitations on the partners’ side, led to lengthy procedures before any money was flowing. Senegal, for 
instance, was notified of its eligibility in December 2004 and presented its concept paper in July 2008. To 
date, there has been no signature of a compact with Senegal; no substantial money flowed within the MCC to 
Senegal.5 The MCC might thus be a good illustration of the difficulty of determining how to work with 
countries with limited capacities, even when having established with whom to work. And with regard to the 
purpose of division of labour among donors, the MCC operates exclusively on a bilateral basis, i.e. outside any 
existing framework of donor coordination. The MCC, however, should not be confused with the entire US 
development aid: it was established parallel to existing aid structures, namely United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). It is thus not really a tool for aid concentration – as USAID funds are not 
touched. 
Source: MCC website: http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/about/index.shtml 
4.2.1 Germany 
German development policy is understood as a “global structural and peace policy” (German 
Federal Government 2008) and usually refers to the four goals that are to be found in the UN 
Millennium Declaration: reducing poverty worldwide (as the overarching goal for 
development cooperation), protecting the natural environment, building peace and realising 
democracy, and promoting equitable forms of globalisation. These goals, the ministry states, 
are “interlinked, mutually reinforcing and mutually limiting, and they are closely related to all 
the Millennium Development Goals.”6  
                                                 
3  See MCC website: http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/about/index.shtml  
4  See annual report on country selection of the MCC: http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/bm.doc/mcc-report-fy09-
countryselection.pdf  
5  In April 2009, the MCC agreed to fund the preparatory phase with up to US$ 13 million. See: 
http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/bm.doc/qsr-dev-senegal.pdf  
6  http://www.bmz.bund.de/en/principles/aims/objectives/index.html, downloaded 28 July 2009. 
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German aid has increased substantially over the last few years, particularly when put into 
perspective of more budgetary increases and cuts in other government portfolios in the 
German budget (2009 over 2008: an increase of 13.23%). The growth rate compared to other 
donors (2008 over 2007), however, is relatively modest at 5.7% and the share of aid related to 
the Gross National Income is at 0.38%, i.e. still relatively far off the mark of 0.51% by 2010. 
Yet, in absolute figures, Germany is the second largest bilateral donor in the DAC (following 
the US, ahead of the UK).7  
Germany’s commitment to the aid effectiveness agenda is high (Ashoff et al. 2008), even 
though – in its implementation – somewhat more difficult because of the fragmented 
organisational setting , as the DAC emphasised in its peer review of German aid 2005:  
“In a context of development co-operation based on the principles of partnership and 
ownership the German model of development co-operation may no longer be appropriate 
from a partner country perspective“ (DAC 2005a, 12).  
Under the leadership of the Ministry, however, Germany has elaborated a detailed plan of 
operations for the implementation of the Paris Agenda and the Accra Agenda for Action, 
updated in March 2009 (for the ministry and the major implementing agencies; available also 
online and in English).8 
The issue of a better division of labour – and the subsequent EU Code of Conduct – was 
particularly prominent in EU debates during the German EU Presidency in the first half of 
2007. German documents, consequently, emphasis the need for better division of labour, 
albeit often focussing on the aspect of in-country division of labour (see also the above 
mentioned German plan of operations on Paris and Accra). 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) generally acknowledge the need to focus official 
development assistance to a selected number of countries. They, however, were critical of the 
specific list the ministry presented in 2000, e.g. on the absence of numerous LDCs from the 
list. And they particularly highlighted the non-binding character of the state’s partner 
selection for their activities (cf. VENRO 2000).9 The Accra Agenda is seen critically by 
German NGOs, as they see a danger of “depolitisation” of cooperation through what they 
regard as a technocratic approach; power-politics, they claim, are neglected in the Accra 
agenda. NGOs demand is to focus more on the “aid orphans versus darlings”-problématique.10 
Decision-making on geographical concentration 
The overall increase in German ODA money since the late 1990s was parallel to political 
moves towards more focused German aid. At the end of the 1990s, the number of partner 
countries was at 120. This number was subsequently reduced to 75 in 1998 and to further 
down to 58 after a revision of the list of partner countries in February 2008 (see Annex I). 
                                                 
7  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/34/42459170.pdf, downloaded, 28 July 2009. 
8  http://www.bmz.bund.de/en/zentrales_downloadarchiv/grundsaetze_und_ziele/OP_Paris_Agenda_ 
englisch.pdf  
9  For the written input of VENRO, the umbrella organisation of German development NGOs, in the 
process in 2000, see: http://www.venro.org/fileadmin/Publikationen/ 
Einzelveroeffentlichungen/Deutsche_Entwicklungpolitik/stellungnahme_laenderkonzentration.pdf 
10  http://www.womnet.de/content/2008/VENRO_Positionspapier_Accra.pdf  
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This number of partner countries, however, does not mean that no activities are conducted in 
other countries. Activities in at least 21 countries are funded via regional or thematic 
programmes (such as the Caucasus Initiative or the programme on fragile states). In practice, 
the geographical concentration is a slow process with regard to phasing out of German aid 
agencies (Faust / Ziaja 2009). As BMZ puts it on its website: “In 17 countries, ongoing 
programmes will be completed as planned and bilateral development cooperation then 
brought to an end.”11 
Overall, and in line with European and international endeavours, Africa is explicitly featuring 
high on the German development agenda: “Since it is in Africa that the greatest efforts are 
required to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, Germany’s engagement in Africa 
will be particularly strong. But other regions too will be able to count on Germany as a 
reliable partner.”12 Almost half of Germany’s partner countries (24) are located in Sub-
Saharan Africa (including South Africa).  
Formal criteria 
Decisions on concentrating on certain countries follows criteria that were first established in 
early 1990s and have only been slightly revised since. Cooperation partners for Germany are 
selected according to the following five criteria: 
— How needy is the country with regard to poverty, how prone is the country to crisis 
and how relevant for the protection of global public goods; 
— Overarching ecological and political goals and interests, 
— Aspects of good governance in partner countries, 
— Relevance and significance of the German contribution as compared to other 
bilateral and multilateral donors (with a view on international division of labour), 
— Regional aspects and historical linkages (BMZ 2008, 344).13 
Some elements are linked to specific monitoring tools, most importantly so how prone a 
country is to crisis. BMZ has an own early warning system that builds on academic country 
experts that – besides the usual diplomatic information via the Foreign Office – informs BMZ 
decision-making without being mechanistically applied.14 
With regard to the quality of governance, BMZ has worked on a tool to assess governance. 
Furthermore, socio-political assessments are conducted by experts in academia, informing 
policy-making. Countries with good governance are preferably supported by specific 
                                                 
11  http://www.bmz.bund.de/en/principles/aims/index.html  
12  http://www.bmz.bund.de/en/principles/aims/index.html  
13  Own translation. A good illustration of the aspect of “historical linkages” is Namibia, an African middle-
income country that would presumably not qualify for aid in terms of using an exclusive indicator of poverty 
prevalence. Poverty is widespread in Namibia. Yet, the country has own resources; income distribution in 
Nambia among the most unequal in the world. The country, however, has substantial German historical 
legacy; it was a German colony until 1919 and German colonial rule was particularly cruel to the Herero 
people. Germany is the biggest bilateral donor to Namibia. On the other hand, current political 
considerations prevail over colonial past: Togo – with negative governance records – is not among 
Germany’s partner countries, despite its German colonial past.  
14  http://www.bmz.de/en/issues/Peacebuilding/crisis_prevention/index.html  
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instruments (programme-based approaches) and in these countries, BMZ states, the division 
of labour according to the EU Code of Conduct will be particularly pursued (BMZ 2008, 
344). 
The aspect of “relevance for the protection of global public goods” (or for global governance 
in general) already points to the specific focus of German development policy on so-called 
“anchor countries”, i.e. countries that are crucially important for the stability and development 
of their respective region (China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Egypt and others). 
With these countries, specific focus should also be placed on possibilities of trilateral 
cooperation, not least to enhance mutual learning possibilities and thereby better integrate 
“emerging countries” into the international development community.  
Informal criteria 
The criteria indicated above are open for – and explicitly intended – for political 
considerations. None of the expert opinions leads to immediate (mechanistic) actions. 
Emphasis is on the flexibility of partner selection and their regular revision in cross-
departmental exercises within the German government (BMZ 2008, 345). Overall, there is a 
clear poverty-orientation in German aid allocation and few indications on geo-strategic or 
economic selection based on German preferences; a separate development ministry might 
have been instrumental for this effect (Faust / Ziaja 2009).15 This cross-departmental 
coordination is particularly relevant in Germany, as development policy is the portfolio of an 
autonomous development cooperation ministry. Both BMZ and Foreign Office administer 
funds that qualify as ODA; the Foreign Office is in charge of humanitarian assistance and 
cultural cooperation, whereas development cooperation proper is the portfolio of BMZ.16 
Rationales for partner selection and/or political terms are not always in sync between actors 
such as BMZ and the Foreign Office.17  
4.2.2 Ireland 
Over the last years Ireland has experienced an outstanding process of substantially increasing 
both the quality and the quantity of its development aid. As one of the smaller Nordic+ 
donors, Ireland is perceived as a groundbreaker for issues such as policy coherence, 
governance and civil society. 
Irish political and technical commitment to the aid effectiveness paradigm is very consistent 
and has shaped good practices for the international development community, for example in 
                                                 
15  The indicator for poverty-orientation here is the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. The authors argue 
that albeit being crude, this GNI per capita figure includes the potential for redistribution per country, i.e. the 
internal development finance potential is thus included. 
16  The coalition agreement of the current German government speaks of development cooperation as “an 
autonomous part of the overall German foreign policy”. External representation in partner countries is via 
the German Embassy; development experts are often seconded from BMZ to the Foreign Office. 
Representation in-country is also secured via implementing agencies’ offices (GTZ and KfW as key actors). 
(Cf. Ashoff et al. 2008). 
17  An illustration for this can be found in a think tank study on the German Africa policy that deplores the lack 
of strategic vision of the Foreign Office. The study often refers to BMZ strategies and priorities and 
critically reflects on Foreign Office’s tools for policy-making (cf. Mair / Tull 2009).  
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mainstreaming gender equality (DAC 2009b). On the basis of its White Paper launched in 
2006 and widely consulted among national stakeholders, Irish Aid’s work is guided by 
principles such as partnership, transparency and effectiveness, and links its agenda for more 
effective aid to the close collaboration with like-minded donors, particularly at the country 
level. For the years 2008-2010, Ireland presented an Action Plan outlining priorities for the 
implementation of the Paris Declaration, improved partnership and more public awareness for 
aid effectiveness. Currently, a new AAA implementation plan is underway (DAC 2008h).  
Often admired for its strong bid for effective aid, Ireland received in April 2009 a very 
favourable DAC peer review. However, also concerns over recent aid cuts were raised by the 
DAC. On the other hand, Ireland has achieved good notes in most existing rankings. The 
Commitment to Development Index, launched by the Centre for Global Development, reflects 
the strong improvement of Irish aid which in 2008 ranks fifth of the 22 listed DAC donors, 
mainly due to the allocation to least developed countries (see below) and a totally untied aid. 
Even more excellence is reflected in the 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration. 
Among 34 donors, Ireland stands out as a runner-up in both the use of national Public 
Financial Management (PFM) systems and the reduction of Parallel Implementation Units, 
occupies a first place in the use of programme-based aid and achieves a tenth position in the 
coordination of donor missions. 
Decision-making on geographical concentration 
For already some years now, the high degree of concentration of Irish bilateral aid is 
perceived as a “great asset” (DAC 2003b, 13) and “main strength” (ibid., 37). Currently, 
Ireland is focussing its development cooperation on nine priority partner countries. Since 
2003, Vietnam and Malawi have been integrated in Ireland’s bilateral programme portfolio in 
a period in which Ireland’s net ODA increased 90% in real terms. Between 2005 and 2007, 
the share of the nine programme partners was 47% of bilateral spending, a relatively high 
figure (ibid., 14). 
Undoubtedly, Irish aid benefited from a clear-cut approach to concentrate its efforts on a 
limited group of poor and least developed countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, 
adopted before its rapid growth in financing. The 2006 White Paper, a comprehensive policy 
document set to frame the expansion of the aid programme, explains the need to focus on 
Africa on the basis of Ireland’s commitment with fighting against poverty, helping “those in 
greatest need” (IrishAid 2006, 21). Apart from a limited margin for expanding existing 
organisational structure in Irish aid, a possible strong incentive for Ireland to concentrate 
greatly may be found in the desire to have an impact at the country level, which is difficult to 
achieve for smaller donors with highly fragmented activities. This is also reflected in the 
cautious geographical extension with the inclusion of two new partner countries, Malawi and 
Vietnam. In both, Ireland established Embassies in 2007 and 2005, respectively, invested 
heavily in staff, built sound medium-term partnerships and is already a strong player in aid 
coordination, for example chairing the Heads of Cooperation mechanism in Malawi. 
Proportionally, the sensitive aid cut in the national emergency budget (20.1% with respect to 
ODA in 2008, and 21.9% from the projected total in 2009) will affect less bilateral 
cooperation (major cuts will be made in multilateral channels and reduce sharply funding of 
the prestigious Irish NGOs) Thus individual bilateral portfolio might not suffer a real 
downturn, although further reductions might change this situation drastically. With respect to 
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2008, the 2009 aid budget was reduced by 195 million Euros (CONCORD 2009), which is 
above the total funding directed to the bilateral priority country programmes in 2007, only 
185.1 million Euros (IrishAid 2007, 68). A refocus of priority spending in “sub-Saharan 
Africa, on least developed countries and on reducing chronic hunger and vulnerability” has 
already been announced by the government.18 
Formal criteria 
Partly generated by it own experience with poverty, the main underpinning for Ireland’s 
geographical concentration relates to the desire to address the necessities of the poorest 
countries. The 2006 White Paper explains in general terms the following as criteria for 
“giving aid”: 
— Need: Particularly focussing on absolute poverty; 
— Capacity: Ireland’s specific contributions; 
— Aid works: Appropriate environments for aid effectiveness; 
— Irish Aid works: Potential of Irish aid to become effective in specific contexts. 
Furthermore the White Paper justifies the focus on the then eight programme countries with: 
— The need for achieving the Millennium Development Goals; 
— Existing relations in trade, migration and diplomatic relations; 
— Previous peacekeeping and crisis management operations; 
— Opportunities for promoting regional development institutions and programmes. 
Reasoning aid in a very broad context of “shared humanity”, these criteria were not related to 
any qualitative and/or quantitative analysis which could explain the selection undertaken. The 
White Paper also claims that “political and strategic motives” do not influence decisions on 
allocation of Irish development assistance, although some of the broad selection criteria refer 
to political questions which also relate to more difficult parts of Ireland’s policy coherence in 
the realm of trade and investment, highlighted also by the Development Commitment Index. 
Informal criteria 
The capacity to impact more directly on poverty reduction in poorest countries seems to be 
one of the more informal guidelines in concentration of Irish aid, vividly reflected in recent 
press statements of the government. This is related mainly to the philosophy of the “deep and 
lasting commitment that we have as a nation, to fight injustice, oppression and poverty 
wherever it exists” (Keogh 2009). The investment in diplomatic representation in new 
programme countries, such as in 2007 in Malawi, also might reflect the desire for capacity for 
political dialogue and interest in higher-level visibility in countries that previously received 
very limited amounts of aid (yearly 3 million Euros).19 Finally, and highlighted by several 
DAC reviews, management capacities have often been perceived as limited and might have 
been further affected by the move of Irish Aid from the capital to the more provincial 
                                                 
18  Minister of State for Overseas Development, Peter Power’s, address to the Dóchas AGM, 30 April 2009 
19  Irish Aid: Overview Malawi, http://www.irishaid.gov.ie/Malawi.asp 
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Limerick. This could explain the bid for concentration in view of the institutional and 
organisational restrictions, in general a caveat for smaller donors to spread the resources 
widely. 
4.2.3 Sweden 
Sweden is a very active member of the Nordic+ countries, the donor group that has introduced 
innovation and a strong drive into the aid effectiveness agenda, among other things substantial 
work on delegated cooperation as a tool for improved international complementarity. 
Stockholm created the ground for advancing towards the current Paris and Accra 
commitments with its Policy for Global Development, prepared as a bill by the previous 
government in 2002 and endorsed (as guidelines) by the parliament in December 2003. This 
broad policy document stresses an improved effectiveness of Swedish development 
cooperation both internally (such as untying 100% of its aid) and towards other actors, 
enabling partner leadership and influencing multilateral and other donors to adapt to the aid 
effectiveness agenda. After signing the Paris Declaration, the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) presented an Action Plan for Increased Aid 
Effectiveness for the years 2006-2008 with a strong focus on improved aid delivery 
mechanisms at the field level. 
Sweden is a highly respected donor among the development community and is classified 
among the top performers in different rankings, such as the Centre for Global Development’s 
Commitment to Development Index, where it scored highest in terms of quantity and quality 
of development aid in 2008. The monitoring of the Paris Declaration in 2008, however, shows 
more mixed results. Among a total of 34 donors, Sweden ranks ninth (of a total of 32 donors) 
in the use of national PFM systems, fourteenth in the reduction of Parallel Implementation 
Units, twelfth in the use of  programme-based aid and fifteenth in the coordination of donor 
missions.  
Decision-making on geographical concentration 
The concern over excessive geographical coverage was addressed in Sweden’s Policy for 
Global Development which called for a more focussed assistance to poor countries, 
particularly in the African context. The Action Plan for Increased Aid Effectiveness gave 
some orientations towards sectoral division of labour at the country level, but does not refer to 
geographical concentration. However, in response to the DAC peer reviews in 2000 and 2005 
(calling for a “more strategically selective concentration of countries and sectors“) (DAC 
2005b, 13), the current Swedish government decided in August 2007 to implement a drastic 
reduction of the number of priority partner countries for bilateral cooperation from 67 to 33, 
thus withdrawing aid from 34 developing countries by 2010.20 Three main priority categories 
were established: long-term partnerships, conflict-affected countries and reform cooperation 
in Eastern Europe. 
                                                 
20  Focused bilateral development cooperation. This shifts attention to other parts of partnership, beyond ODA, 
and does not mean a withdrawal of all Swedish activities, e.g. in South Africa.  
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Implementing geographical concentration in a very straightforward way, the Swedish 
government ensured a high level of transparency regarding the process and its underlying 
rationale (see description of criteria below). For example, partner countries eligible for 
phasing-out were informed six months ahead by the respective Swedish embassy. Though, 
consultations were not extensive, and particularly Swedish stakeholders, among them the 
retired SIDA Director General (SIDA 2007) and civil society organisations such as Diakonia, 
regretted what they saw as a rather autonomous and overly hasty approach of the government 
(Swedisch Diakonia 2007). Dialogue and coordination with other donors was felt not to have 
been conducted strategically, even if the period of decision-making synchronised with the 
launch of the European Union’s Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of 
Labour. A sensitive problem for communicating the concentration process was its apparent 
disconnect from global processes of development policy-making, with very weak references 
to the overall aid effectiveness commitments by public documents and statements. 
Formal criteria 
As the leader of the concentration process, Sweden’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
published in August 2007, shortly after the final decision on the new priority countries, two 
policy documents explaining the background (Swedish MFA 2007a) and the decisive factors 
(Swedish MFA 2007b) for the revised country focus. The following four groups of criteria 
were established: 
— Poverty: A “needs index” based on GNI per capita, malnutrition among children, 
prevalence of Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and aggravating condition, plus HDI, Gini coefficient, primary 
education and GDP growth 
— Effectiveness: Pro-poor and rights-based national development strategy, good 
governance (as CPIA), corruption (Transparency International), results of earlier 
Swedish cooperation, aid dependence (in terms of GDP) and relative funding level 
— Human Rights and democratic governance: Process towards democracy (Economist 
Intelligence Unit) and human rights, involvement of civil society and potential for 
improvements in human rights and democracy 
— Swedish added value: Demand for Swedish expertise (including enterprises), long-
term relations, added value, regional aspects, other donor’s plan for aid to the country 
and active Swedish participation in an ongoing peace process 
As reflected in this list, many of these criteria were backed by well-known indexes and 
available quantitative data, while others relate to rather soft and auto-assessed issues, 
particularly regarding Swedish added value. Overall, Sweden stressed that once the con-
centration process was concluded more focus on Africa, Europe, peace and security, and 
democracy and human rights was achieved (list of priority countries in Annex II). 
Informal criteria 
The MFA acknowledged explicitly that, while “a well-balanced basis for decision-making” 
was pursued, the revised selection of partner countries was a “political decision”. On the other 
hand, the process was linked to the overall reform of the Swedish development cooperation 
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system, perceived as “overdue” by the government,21 and particularly the re-balance of 
influence between the MFA and the recently reformed SIDA. Informally, Swedish 
stakeholders highlight the strong drive of a conservative government in revising profoundly 
the underlying reasoning of the geographic concentration process. In this context, Honduras 
and Nicaragua, long-standing partners with a strong, admittedly rather social-democratic 
orientation that fitted long-time Swedish government values, seem to have been excluded 
more for political reasons than on the basis of the indicated criteria. 
4.2.4 Czech Republic 
As a re-emerging donor since 1995, the Czech Republic has committed to reach ODA/GNI 
ratio of 0.17% in 2010 (EU Council 2005). Even though the quantitative goal for the EU-12 is 
significantly lower than for the EU-15, the country is clearly off-track to reach this. The 
annual volume of bilateral aid is approximately only € 25 million, making the problem of aid 
dispersion particularly urgent. Although the institutional framework has improved, the 
commitment of the country to the qualitative objectives of the Paris Declaration and European 
Consensus is equally weak.  
For example, the Czech presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2009 referred 
to the aid effectiveness agenda only pro forma and – as well as the French presidency – did 
little to push for its implementation. Instead, the presidency – with mixed success – focused 
on promoting its three priorities: (i) access to sustainable sources of energy at local level in 
developing countries, (ii) support of democratic governance, and (iii) the Eastern dimension 
as a cross-cutting priority. The MFA actively participated at the Accra High Level Forum, but 
as far as the preceding preparation of the EU position was concerned, the only Czech priority 
was to strive for softening the proposal on a minimal level of ODA for LDCs. 
Czech aid remains generally tied and donor-driven; current legislation does not allow direct 
financial support of partners in the South. Coordination with other donors has been 
insignificant and the Czech Development Agency (CzDA) does not have any offices in the 
field. The only exception consists in trilateral projects led by DAC donors and the 
membership of CzDA in the Practitioners’ Network for European Development Cooperation 
(CzDA s.a.). 
The Czech Republic is not an OECD DAC member (yet; despite being an OECD member 
state), and therefore the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) does not report the full body of 
statistical data on aid effectiveness, including e.g. gender mainstreaming. The Centre for 
Global Development has not included the country in the Commitment to Development Index 
for the same reason. Policy coherence for development should be explicitly promoted by the 
Council on Foreign Development Cooperation, an advisory body of the MFA, but no 
implementation processes have been set up. Neither has the recent Czech presidency of the 
EU made any efforts to promote the implementation of the Code of Conduct on Division of 
labour in Development Policy. 
                                                 
21  Development Today: 'Reforms overdue'. Sweden slashes number of aid recipients, August 2007 
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Despite these limitations, the Czech Republic is a leading donor with a particularly strong 
development constituency among the post-communist EU member states. It is also the only 
new EU member state to have undergone a special DAC review, which has recommended “to 
reduce the number of priority countries to enhance Czech ODA’s development impact” 
(Czech MFA / OECD 2007). A key challenge for the Czech Republic in aspirations to 
enhance aid effectiveness and to catch up with the lower level of EU-15 performers, however, 
is the recent unsystematic foreign policy interventions in the development cooperation. 
Decision-making on geographical concentration 
In the late 1990s, Czech aid was very limited in volume but fragmented: aid was given to 40 
countries. This was mainly due to a decentralized/fragmented system, in which no less than 
nine line ministries were implementing development projects independently. Sufficient 
political will to centralize decision-making at the MFA and gradually submit the 
implementation to CzDA was found only in 2007. However, the concentration process has 
started earlier: the number of priority countries was set to 20 in 2002 and reduced by half two 
years later, i.e. immediately before the EU accession (Government of the Czech Republic 
2002; 2004). At the same time, the bilateral budget for non-priority countries was limited to 
25%. 
The 2004 strategy paper was drafted by the MFA, with limited input by the implementing 
ministries. It is important to recall that the ministries were in the habit of keeping control of 
their ODA budgets and sectoral concentration did not follow the territorial one. Overall, the 
decision-making process was justified by the international commitments on aid effectiveness, 
but it can also be explained by the motivation of the MFA to use development cooperation as 
a tool of foreign policy. The whole process of selecting priority countries for the period 2006-
2010 was rather opaque and exclusive: NGOs and other non-state actors were formally 
excluded from the process. 
Formal criteria 
The original criteria for assessing (at the time: twenty) priority countries were established by 
the Development Centre, an advisory body to the MFA. The criteria and the number of points 
obtained were presented to the public only ex post and published by the NGDO platform note 
before 2008 (FoRS 2007, 21). Ten sub-criteria were divided in four groups: need for 
assistance, aid absorption capacity, intensity of cooperation, and diplomatic relations. These 
criteria were weighted: 
— Need for assistance: GNI per capita, HDI rank, ODA per capita (max. 15 points) 
— Capacity to receive assistance: existing PRSP, democratic governance, respect for 
human rights and civil liberties (max. 8 points) 
— Intensity of development cooperation: Intensive development cooperation in the past, 
ongoing projects of development cooperation, number of graduates from Czech 
universities (max. 8 points) 
— Presence of an embassy (8 points) 
At first sight, the criteria did not substantially differ from those set by experienced donors. 
However, quality control of aid is mostly absent: a large number of project evaluations were 
already available but sectoral priorities had been determined by the line ministries. Political 
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relations between the Czech Republic and the partner country were formally approximated by 
the presence of an embassy and the number of former students from the South. “Principles of 
coherence, complementarity and coordination with other donor countries” were listed as 
criteria of selecting subsequent sectors in the 2004 strategy, but no steps seem to have been 
undertaken in this direction. 
Informal criteria 
The comparison of the chart with the final choice of priority countries shows that political 
criteria were informal but equally important as the formal ones (see Annex III). Especially 
political and commercial interests, security concerns and contingent events overweighed the 
well-intentioned focus on aid effectiveness. Out of the ten countries that ranked the best, only 
four eventually became priority countries: Yemen, Angola, Vietnam and Mongolia. There are 
only four LDCs on the complete list of ten countries. 
The MFA excluded or included countries according to its territorial priorities. While Mali and 
Burkina Faso ranked well, the Ministry was already about to close two remaining embassies 
in francophone Africa and thus excluded both countries from the list. On the other hand, the 
middle-income Serbia and Montenegro with Bosnia and Herzegovina did not perform well 
and Moldova had not been assessed at all. Their inclusion reflects direct political and 
commercial interests in South-Eastern Europe. As an expression of transatlantic alliance, 
Afghanistan and Iraq were added as mid-term priorities without country strategy papers. 
Moreover, the final choice responded to personal influence and short-term events as well. For 
example, Ethiopia ranked first but was disqualified because of a diplomatic incident22. Zambia 
was added on the suggestion of the Ministry of Health, but the programme turned into a 
disaster because of serious charges of corruption on the Czech side. 
Implementation and the way forward 
In 2008, the process of concentration of decision-making at the MFA has started and 
immediately translated in further instrumentalisation of development cooperation. The MFA 
informally created a category of six “project countries” plus Georgia. While Cambodia was 
included because of the conclusion of a debt relief agreement and Ethiopia was 
“rehabilitated”, Palestine, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Georgia reflect obvious political and 
security interests. Even though this step has put an end to the support of non-priority 
countries, the overall trend does not lead to genuine concentration and predictable aid 
disbursements. Especially priority countries in Africa have received only modest ODA 
amounts. 
The EU presidency has exhausted MFA’s capacities in 2008-2009 and the political instability 
complicates the predictability of the process of preparing the 2011-2016 strategy, outlined by 
the 2007 government decision on the institutional transformation of the bilateral cooperation. 
If the 2004 criteria did not change significantly, “taking into account the division of labour 
                                                 
22  Alongside Nigeria and South Africa, Ethiopia is the most important political partner of the Czech Republic 
in sub-Saharan Africa. It became a “project country” in 2008 and the most probably it will be selected as a 
programme country from 2011 again. 
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with other donors” concerns now should influence not only the choice of sectors, but also the 
territorial priorities (Government of the Czech Republic 2007).23  
As of June 2009, there have been no promising signals that other than domestic concerns will 
be respected. The MFA has already sent questionnaires on preferred territories and sectors to 
other ministries, NGO, and private sector platforms. The current Minister of Foreign Affairs 
seems to be in favour of further reduction of territorial and sectoral priorities, but there is no 
public debate on the new strategy and the upcoming process remains unclear, including with 
regard to the dialogue with partners and other donors. 
4.3 Summary: What the donor cases indicate 
— All donors appear to be grappling with selection criteria and rationalisation of their 
partner country setup. There is an understanding of the need to explain partner country 
selection as a basic function of domestic accountability. Formal criteria are established 
by all four cases against which to measure the partner country selection. 
— Donor governments tend to draw on rankings by both multilateral and private 
organisations. Parameters such as the UNDP HDI and the achievement in terms of 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are most prominent, while Sweden used a 
broad range of formal selection criteria, including analysis from Transparency 
International or the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
— Self-assessment of the actual and potential contribution of a donor constitutes a 
recurrent criterion in all four cases, using different parameters ranging from the 
presence of an embassy (Czech Republic) to an overall added value in the development 
process (Sweden). In none of the cases were linkages made to independent or official 
assessments of donor performances; the evaluation of this aspect was based on internal 
considerations. 
— In all cases, political considerations can trump formal selection criteria. This is 
irrespective of how formal the selection process is shaped, whether it is linked to 
“objective” indicators (as in the case of Sweden) or has introduced a weighting of 
different indicators (as in the case of the Czech Republic). Partner country selection is 
pursued as a clearly political task and process, linked to overall policy considerations – 
be it foreign policy (where do we have special linkages we can/should build on) or 
ideological considerations of partners’ priorities (where do we have fundamental 
agreement in values).   
— In none of the cases indicated have there been signs of structured consultation among 
donors (within the EU or beyond); partner country selection and thus geographical aid 
allocation seems to be considered solely a sovereign and unilateral decision of donors, 
while there is also a lack of consultation platforms for the concentration processes. 
Thus, in practice, the concentration process is looking “inwards” and not towards the 
concentration among donors across countries. 
— Very little – if any – dialogue has taken place with the partner countries, which 
consequently tend to be unaware of the ongoing concentration processes at the donor 
end of the development partnership. One remarkable contradiction needs to be flagged 
                                                 
23  Paris Declaration or EU documents are not mentioned explicitly in the document but covered by generic 
references to OECD and EU commitments. Coordination with other donors is listed as a task of the MFA 
without further precision. 
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in this section: all donor countries express the “demand” for their aid as a key element 
for why they engage in a partner country. But only in the case of Sweden is there 
experience in early information of partner countries (announcing the inclusion in a list 
of countries eligible for Swedish phase-out).  
— In none of the cases have reductions of the number of partner countries explicitly been 
linked to reductions in aid volumes. At least in a pre-economic crisis world, a 
concentration appears to be driven by concerns about effectiveness and visibility of 
programmes, rather than in the explicit context of downscaling of aid. 
5 Emerging criteria for country-led concentration 
5.1 Methodological considerations 
In general terms, partner countries have not yet engaged in geographical donor concentration 
processes. The following pages will illustrate the (not unfounded) reluctance of partner 
countries. Reasons for this are among others the preference for diversity and the fear of losing 
development financing sources. However, to the extent that donors are pursuing more actively 
their cross-country concentration, the selection of development partners is an ever more 
crucial decision with regard to the leeway a country leadership has. The capacity of a certain 
partner country to identify criteria for choosing donors is relevant to both the aid relations at 
the country level and the partnership at the global level. In practice, only one case of active 
and large scale donor concentration by a developing country appears to have happened: in 
2001, the Indian government selected five donors as partners and asked all others to disengage 
at Federal level (see Box 4). 
As part of a creative thought exercise, the authors of this discussion paper contacted decision-
makers and policy-advisors in developing countries (in cases where previous working 
relationships had been established), asking them to think (to themselves) about whom they 
would want to keep as donor if they had to chose from donors and then rationalise their 
considerations: what were the criteria on which they based the selection? Although the highly 
politically sensitive nature of our research interest prevented us from obtaining 
straightforward answers, it still served as an interesting starting point for deeper discussions 
from a more “empowered” position of partner countries.  
An alternative entry point for country-led criteria can be found in the ongoing processes of in-
country division of labour. Qualitative criteria are emerging in several developing countries 
 as a result from the implementation of different instruments for improved in-country 
complementarity. By referring to possible preferences of partner countries towards certain 
characteristics, capacities and performances of donors, these criteria might as well create a 
basis for partner country perspectives in the decision-making on cross-country division of 
labour. 
Within an explorative approach, three main dimensions are of importance for the analysis of 
the emerging criteria for country-led division of labour.  
1. A partner country with a longstanding experience and leadership in aid effectiveness 
and donor coordination is likely to be more proactive in assessing donor performance. 
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2. If division of labour is already part of the national agenda of aid coordination, the 
underlying discussions and debates might have triggered already some qualitative 
criteria or at least reflections on how to assess the contributions of donors. Real 
country leadership is a key factor for criteria shaped by national priorities, but even 
supposed “division of labour champions” are struggling with real influence and often 
do not prioritise donor complementarity in face of diverse incentives (for example, 
between the Ministry of Finance and the line ministries). This explains why in most 
cases criteria are emerging only very timidly. 
3. The third dimension aims to address this gap by exploring existing policy documents, 
particularly development planning and aid coordination instruments. Although not 
always dubbed “criteria”, several qualitative aspects of donor performance appear in 
official plans, reports and evaluations. These constitute a strong basis for analysing 
emerging country-led criteria grown on the terrain of national processes. 
 
Box 4:  India’s decision to concentrate donors 
In 2001, the Indian government launched its new policy for bilateral cooperation, which included a clear bid 
for ending aid dependency and for becoming a donor on its own right. In this context, a significant reduction 
in the number of donors active in the country was pursued. The following four key criteria were applied: 
- Aid volume: donors with an annual portfolio smaller than 25 million USD would be “relieved” from 
providing aid to the government and should thus channel their more limited funds through NGO and 
multilateral channels. Initially, India considered even the option of only accepting aid from G-8 members. 
- No tied aid: India decided to reject any aid linked primarily to the interests of donor countries  
- Transaction costs: given the high cost and lack of activities fragmented bilateral donors working in small 
niches, gave India a clear preference for multilateral aid 
- Non-interference: India wished to avoid any interference by donors on policy issues such as nuclear 
testing and governance, on which especially the Nordic donors (with smaller volumes of aid) had been 
very critical. 
More details: 
2003/04 Union budget speech (http://www.indiabudget.nic.in/ub2003-04/bs/speecha.htm), article 126; also 
Price (2004); de Groot et al. (2008).  
5.2 Country cases 
The selection of country cases from a recipient country perspective proved to be more 
difficult than the choice of donor countries. In most partner countries, division of labour 
processes is still in a very early stage, perceived as predominately donor-driven and politically 
too sensitive. In several countries, officials and advisors in charge declined to share more 
detailed information and/or stated that donor complementarity is not a priority for the national 
government. Finally, partner countries with low levels of aid dependence, for example 
middle-income countries, preferred to treat ongoing processes in donor concentration at the 
country level with a high degree of confidentiality, given the political implications.. 
This explains why only three country cases have been included in this discussion paper: 
Cambodia, Malawi and Uganda, while a fourth case, Mauritania, is explained more briefly in 
Box 5. Attempts at a better division of labour among donors in Mauritania have been aborted 
after the coup d’etat in 2008. All three cases are classified as Least Developed Countries by 
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Box 5: Strategic positioning of development partners in Mauritania 
In the aftermath of the Paris Declaration, the government of Mauritania pursued division of labour through an 
assessment tool of donor activities at the programme level, presented in March 2007. With the assistance of 
the World Bank, Mauritania aimed at improving the basis for selectivity among donors using two aspects: the 
priority of a certain programme and the contribution of a certain donor to the planned outcomes of the 
programmes. Each aspect constitutes an axis within Cartesian coordinates which positions of each donor in 
four quadrants. For example, a high contribution of a donor with sensitive contribution to development results 
would imply that the donor should take the leadership, while low support with little impact in outcomes should 
lead to a phase-out of the donor from the programme. 
The particular value of this tool lies in its three-fold approach to division of labour, including country needs, 
the comparative advantages of donors and the relative weight of each development partner. Both sides of the 
development partnership in Mauritania benefitted: the government of Mauritania was able to identify best 
placed donors in a given sector as well as to assess if support is sufficient or excessive in different sectors. For 
their part, donors could review their strategy of assisting the country. 
Donors’ comparative advantages were assessed by the government on the basis of the following criteria: 
- Expertise and proficiency at the sector level, including institutional, team and focal point competence, 
reactivity and performance 
- Regional experience, taking into account experiences in the same sector, but another (African) country 
- Donor performance in programmes and projects, including achievement of results, team competences and 
reactivity 
- Additional criteria such as advisory capacity, institutional support and coordination with other donors 
More information on the process and tools in: IDA (2007); Rantrua (2007); Sidi-Baba (2007). 
the World Bank and can thus be considered aid dependent, resulting in a much different 
position for negotiating and allocating aid than the emerging global power India. 
5.2.1 Cambodia 
Context: Development and aid effectiveness 
Cambodia has achieved a medium human development and ranks 134th of the 179 countries 
covered by the UNDP’s Human Development Index in 2008. With aid representing 7.7% of 
its GNI in 2006, Cambodia is a moderately aid-dependent country whose population obtained 
a GNI per capita of 2,920 USD in purchasing parity terms in 2006. Over the last few years, 
poverty reduction has benefited from a booming economy and increasing revenues from 
natural resources, while the consequences the genocidal regime, limited national capacities 
and rural poverty still pose huge challenges for future development. With an overall 
moderately weak governance, Cambodia’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) improved between 2005 and 2007 from 3.1 to 3.2. 
The donor community encompasses around 30 bilateral and multilateral agencies, and 
includes several emerging donors such as China and Korea (both of which report on their 
funding and participate in the PD monitoring survey) as well as Qatar and Kuwait. The weight 
of the donors is quite homogenously distributed, with Japan and China as the most important 
donors in 2007 (Royal Government of Cambodia 2008, ii). Thus far there are no practical 
experiences with phasing out, but at the beginning of 2009 Canada announced its exit from 
Cambodia, an option that, according to experts consulted, the UK is also studying. 
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Since 2006 Cambodia has invested heavily in a consistent and detailed set-up of its 
development and aid effectiveness framework, while also taking stock at different regional 
and global platforms. At the top of development planning, the second phase of the 
governmental Rectangular Strategy guides through the political priorities concerned about an 
enabling environment, economic growth and good governance. The National Strategic 
Development Plan (NSDP) 2006-2010 operationalises the Rectangular Strategy by 
establishing ten priority goals, nine of them country-specific MDGs and the tenth related to 
de-mining efforts. Although there are still some challenges to ensure budget linkage, recent 
reforms in Cambodia’s Public Financial Management seem to indicate substantial progress 
towards an increasingly strong development strategy (DAC 2008j). 
Jointly with Laos and Vietnam, Cambodia24 is pioneering donor coordination in South East 
Asia. The government manages aid towards the NSDP priorities on the basis of the National 
Operational Guidelines and the Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation 
Management 2006–2010. Aid effectiveness is addressed in the Cambodia Declaration on 
Enhancing Aid Effectiveness (2006), which localises the Paris agenda in the national context, 
and the Harmonization, Alignment and Results Action Plan (H-A-R) 2006-2010, which 
prioritises activities, assigns responsibilities and tracks progress. Focussing at the sector level, 
the H-A-R measures the use of PBA, delegated cooperation, mission and studies calendar and 
donors’ adaptation to the aid effectiveness principles. 
Progress in division of labour 
Cambodia has casted a sharp light on fragmentation as one of the mayor challenges in 
achieving a more rational aid delivery, but uses a rather cautious approach to division of 
labour. The first Aid Effectiveness Report (AER), launched in 2007, offers a detailed and 
comprehensive view on the “highly deconcentrated aid environment” in Cambodia, described 
as “one of the most competitive in the world” (Royal Government of Cambodia 2007, 6). 
Fragmentation is elevated both at the sector25 and the donor level.26 However, instead of 
claiming for concentration as a solution, the government indicates its preference to preserve 
and manage diversity, conserving a broad range of policy perspectives, while simultaneously 
increasing the use of PBA and developing national capacities. 
Subsequent official analysis maintains this prudent standpoint, but also opens a door for 
further work on division of labour. The 2008 AER identifies as main lines for addressing 
fragmentation the strengthening of PBA, the increasing use of delegated cooperation and 
“some form of division of labour approach” (ibid., 20). While presenting a first group of 
principles (see below), the document also highlights the difficulties for an aid-dependent 
                                                 
24  The three countries have engaged in a regional Joint Initiative on Mutual Accountability which promotes 
South-South learning on reforming donor-partner relations at the country level. 
25  According to the 2007 AER, education, governance, health and rural development are attended by a very 
large number of donors and projects. Less attention is drawn to consequently highly concentrated sectors 
such as food aid, budget support, banking and urban planning. 
26  The 2007 AER introduces a composite index of project and sector fragmentation based on the Herfandahl 
Index and the average project disbursement, which shows that USA, the Global Fund, China, Switzerland 
and the UK are most concentrated donors, while New Zealand, Canada, UN, France and Australia contribute 
a very fragmented aid portfolio (page 7) 
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country to lead the division of labour and feed into the identification of comparative 
advantages as requested by the AAA.27 
On the donor side, Cambodia’s participation in the EU Fast Track Initiative has induced 
deeper discussions among EU donors on how to promote division of labour (Royal 
Government of Cambodia 2008, 20), focussing thus far rather on the processes than on 
outcomes (Wood et al. 2008, 29). 
Emerging criteria for donor concentration 
The main landmark for emerging criteria for donor concentration arises from the 2008 AER 
which sets principles for guiding through further work on (in-country) division of labour, 
within the reservations expressed by the government about the overall capacity to lead 
donors’ complementarity and the need for diversity of policy options. Apart from process-
oriented aspects,28 the government introduces the following donor-related criteria: 
— Headquarter mandate and a recognised role in a sector activity 
— Established sector expertise in Cambodia and commitment to maintaining technical 
presence 
— Predictable and committed funding of the sector 
— Aggregate consistency and complementarity of a partner’s country programme profile 
— Demonstrated trust and working relationships with Government counterparts 
— Commitment to implementing agreed sector guidelines and aid effectiveness practices 
— Capacity to accept some form of leadership or coordination role that has collective utility 
Although focussing on sector complementarity, most of these criteria generate essential 
landmarks for geographic donor concentration as well. At the global level of donor 
complementarity, the recent Aid Effectiveness Evaluation of an Independent Review Team 
identifies additionally the following “institutional incentives inductive for compliant 
development partner behaviours” (Wood et al. 2008, 42): 
— Commitment to aid effectiveness: The aid effectiveness principles should be 
embedded in the operational structure, skilled aid effectiveness focal points should be 
available and the working environment should enable learning on and dissemination of 
good practices 
— Flexibility and risk-taking: Innovation as opposed to strict rule compliance should 
give room for a greater result-orientation 
— Integrity of the development agenda: Commercial and political interests should not 
influence into the development agenda and focus on fighting against poverty 
                                                 
27  The 2008 AER states that leading division of labour “may understandably be a fraught and precarious 
undertaking for an aid-dependent government” (page 20), while the 2008 Cambodia Evaluation of Aid 
Effectiveness find that “it would unquestionably be a difficult and uncomfortable task for the RGC [Royal 
Government of Cambodia] to play the expected leading role in this area” (page 35) 
28  Such as the consideration of different levels of complementarity, the need for diversity, the prevention of 
orphan sectors, and the specific role of the International Finance Institution (IFI) and the UN. 
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In sum, these emerging criteria add up to a quite clear picture of the preferences of the 
government in Phnom Penh, while other influential factors should be taken into account, 
particularly in the realm of commercial and investment relations, particularly in sectors such 
as national resources, tourism and agriculture. 
5.2.2 Malawi 
Context: Development and aid effectiveness 
Ranking 18th from the bottom of the Human Development Index 2008, Malawi is a highly 
aid-dependent partner country, with aid representing 30.5% of its GNI in 2006. According to 
the World Development Report 2008, GNI per capita amounts only 720 USD in purchasing 
parity terms in 2006. Malawi’s huge development challenges are particularly evident in its 
vulnerability to external shocks, a fragile food security, the impact of HIV/AIDS and, often 
related to the latter, low national capacities. Malawi’s CPIA remained stable between 2005 
and 2007, achieving each year a rating of 3.4, indicating a moderately weak governance. 
In contrast to its neighbouring donor darlings Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, the small 
land-locked country hosts a rather fluctuant and unstable aid community, with only the 
Department of International Development (DfID) as a “traditional”, albeit most relevant, 
donor. Malawi has a sensitive history of donors’ exiting the country. In 2002, Denmark pulled 
out after a diplomatic incident in only five months, which caused important damages in the 
agriculture sector. The Netherlands dedicated 5 years (1999-2004) for a more cautious 
phasing-out process with a view on sustainability (van der Meer et al. 2008). In 2009, Malawi 
is affected by the pull-out of Canada and Sweden (which implemented its aid in delegated 
cooperation with Norway). On the other hand, donors such as Ireland have entered the 
country (see section 4), while among emerging donors China is a mayor player after 
announcing a USD 6 billion aid programme and establishing diplomatic relations with 
Malawi in late 2007.29 
Since Malawi’s independence in 1964, country leadership was often undermined by 
corruption and bad governance (cf. as an example, Rakner 2004). Though, the government 
under president Bingu wa Mutharika, elected for a first period in May 2004 and confirmed for 
a second term in the elections on 29 May 2009, brought some positive changes in 
macroeconomic and public financial management, especially through fight against corruption. 
Over the last five years, Malawi invested in a second-generation approach to development 
policies and aid coordination. The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) 2006-
2011 establishes five MDG themes: sustainable economic growth, social protection, social 
development, infrastructure and good governance, with health and education as overarching 
sectors. On this basis, MGDS annual reviews are being prepared informing the budgeting 
process and orientating both foreign and domestic resources. In spite of difficulties to 
translate the MGDS at the sub-national level and in consistent sector programmes, Malawi’s 
national development strategy is perceived as “a sound basis” for achieving a solid ownership 
in 2010 (DAC 2008k). However, in face of a strong leadership and improving capacities at the 
                                                 
29  Reuters: Taiwan says can't match $6 bln China aid to Malawi, 8 January 2008 
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Ministry of Finance, there are still challenges to broaden country ownership to and share the 
agenda with other ministries (Afrodad 2007). 
In parallel to the MGDS, the government also created the basis for the coordination and 
alignment of aid to national priorities. Designing different national and sector coordination 
mechanisms, the Development Assistance Strategy (DAS) 2006-2011 includes an action plan 
that sets 26 targets around the five Paris Declaration principles. Within the DAS, the targets 
on narrowed funding gaps and improved predictability are of particular importance for 
international donor concentration, since there relate to individual and collective 
responsibilities of the donor community. Finally, the Ministry of Finance in Lilongwe has 
been publishing an annual Debt and Aid Report since 2005, which includes a review on the 
progress in implementing the aid effectiveness (see below). 
Progress in division of labour 
Since late 2008, Malawi has started a national process on debating in-country division of 
labour. On the basis of the 2007/2008 Debt and Aid Report, the fragmentised deployment of 
donors among sectors is assessed. The available data indicate that among 17 donors, five 
major donors (more than 10% of total disbursements)30 contribute 76.3% in fiscal year 
2007/2008, while the five most lightweight donors amount to only 3.3% of total 
disbursements. 
At the sector level, the report states that “seven of the seventeen donors covered (…) are 
involved in eight or more of the sixteen sectors”, being the most crowded sectors health, 
education and economic governance (with twelve donors each). A recent draft of a “Malawi 
Aid Atlas” includes in this analysis the number of projects and programmes per donor in each 
sector, showing huge disparities. As a participant of the EU Fast-Track Initiative, Malawi 
launched a kick-off meeting on division of labour in March 2009, in which both in-country 
processes, often still lacking of sufficient leadership at the sector level, and recent phasing-out 
processes, particularly on Sweden’s exit (see section 4), were discussed. Tensions have been 
identified in the interests and incentives of the Ministry of Finance and line ministries, with 
the latter often wanting to maintain control over sector funding of external partners. Thus far, 
rather weak practical impulses have come from the EU’s Code of Conduct which, partly due 
to the limited number of European donors,31 is still not being implemented in a strategic way. 
Emerging criteria for donor concentration 
The launch of the debate on both in-country division of labour and donors’ phasing-out has 
shaped a greater sensitiveness regarding possible comparative advantages at the sector level, 
although analysis of the relatively good quantitative data is still incipient. The government 
also states that existing fragmentation could be easily administered with “strong 
harmonization of procedures and alignment to a defined programme of work” under the 
leadership of the government, which is, however, a situation given in only “few sectors” 
(Ministry of Finance of Malawi 2008, 19). 
                                                 
30  DfID, World Bank, European Commission, Norway and USAID (in this order). 
31  Apart from the Commission, DfID, Germany, Norway (plus Sweden in delegated cooperation) and Ireland 
are part of the donor community in Malawi. 
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On the basis of the existing official documents, the following criteria for pursuing donor 
concentration under the leadership of the country can be identified: 
— Commitment to aid effectiveness: According to the Debt and Aid Report 2007/08, the 
government highlights predictability, use of national (particularly budgetary) systems, 
PIU and programme-based aid (particularly general budget support) as major indicators 
for assessing donors’ performance. Additionally, the DAS emphasises in the alignment 
of country assistance strategies to the MGDS, flexibility in financial cycles, untied aid, 
coordination of missions and analytical work, and the consistent participation in the 
Annual Reviews of the MGDS and the Annual Debt and Aid Reports.32 
— Capacity for and support to dialogue: The DAS establishes a series of coordination 
mechanisms, inviting donors to participate in high-level and sector-level dialogue, as 
well as asking for support by donors for the implementation of the DAS by the national 
government, especially through capacity development at the sector level. 
— Narrowing funding gaps: This central concern of the MGDS indicates the necessity 
for a donor’s financial portfolio to have a certain critical mass in relative and absolute 
terms 
5.2.3 Uganda 
Context: Development and aid effectiveness 
As a low income country, Uganda occupies the 156th rank of the 179 countries included in 
the UNDP’s Human Development Index in 2008. Official Development Aid from DAC 
donors constituted 16.9% of its GNI (1.550 USD per capita in purchasing parity terms) in 
2006, reflecting a relatively high dependency on external development financing. Decades of 
devastating civil war, which still affect the northern part of the country, and both political and 
economic instability have led to a low development. However, Uganda today is also one of 
the fastest growing Sub-Saharan economies, seems to be quite resilient to the global crisis and 
has recently discovered oil and natural gas reserves, which might boost national income in the 
near future (cf. Lundgren 2008). Uganda’s governance is classified by the World Bank as 
moderately strong (CPIA of 3.9 both in 2005 and 2007), although corruption remains a 
challenge to be resolved. 
Uganda hosts a large donor community, which apart from around 20 traditional donors also 
includes newer actors such as China, South Korea, the Czech Republic and Turkey. The 
country strongly attracts multilateral aid. In 2008, the World Bank was by and large the most 
important donor, followed by the European Commission, United Nations and the African 
Development Bank (DAC 2008m). Often dubbed a “donor darling”, Uganda has not yet 
experienced phasing out of donors. 
As an experienced and committed partner country, as early as 1997, Uganda set up a Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which is Uganda's national development framework until 
                                                 
32  With its Debt and Aid Reports, Malawi has introduced an interesting rating system for assessing donors’ 
timeliness in submitting data on the (yearly eight) requests by the Ministry of Finance. For each timely data 
return (within two days of the deadline), donors earn 3 points. 1 point is given for providing data later than 
this, and no points for failing to provide responses altogether in a given occasion. 
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2017 and also works as a medium-term planning tool. Thus, the PEAP is being reviewed 
annually and updated by 5-year development plans, whose latest edition is currently being 
drafted. The 1997-2017 PEAP establishes four main pillars focussing on economic 
management, competiveness, security, conflict resolution and disaster management, good 
governance, and human development. The consistency and coherence of Uganda’s 
development planning, including at the sector and subnational level, is reflected in the fact 
that Uganda is one of only eight partner countries (out of 40) that already comply the 
ownership goals set out by the Paris Declaration, which refer to a consistent national 
development strategy as main ingredient. Additionally, public sector reforms are already 
underway in order to improve capacity and leadership among government staff. 
Aid coordination is also a strong part of Uganda’s experience in promoting aid and 
development effectiveness. In 2001, the government in Kampala agreed a series of 
Partnership Principles (PPs) embedded in the PEAP, which were updated in 2003 with an eye 
toward the Rome Declaration. The PPs were an early articulation by a recipient government 
of the need for improved donors’ performance in harmonisation and alignment issues, while 
also addressing the possibilities to foster trust among both sides and reduce aid dependency 
over time. Building on early experience of the Poverty Alleviation Fund, budget support is 
highlighted as a mayor preference of the government wanting to improve the structure of its 
aid inflows. In 2004 a group of eight donors decided to moved towards developing a common 
aid strategy. This resulted in the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS) 2005-2009 which 
sets out an comprehensive and detailed framework for aid management. Three main principles 
guide the UJAS: support to the implementation of the PEAP, more effective cooperation 
among development partners and with the government, as well as focusing on results and 
outcomes as part of planning and implementation. Currently, the UJAS includes 12 donors 
that represent two third of total ODA (cf. Republic of Uganda 2008). Mainstreaming Paris 
principles and indicators, the UJAS process yielded a results matrix which aligns with the 
PEAP matrix and describes the specific contributions of the members of the donor community 
in terms of financing and analytical work. Progress was to be assessed on an annual basis 
along with the PEAP annual reviews, but is still pending at this stage. However, especially the 
World Bank and the African Development Bank reported major changes in their behaviour as 
a consequence of the endorsement and implementation of the UJAS over the last few years 
(World Bank 2007; AfDB 2006). 
Progress in division of labour 
The diverse donor community, high transaction costs and some especially crowded sectors 
(such as health, roads and humanitarian aid) have long been noted as a problematic obstacle 
for aid effectiveness. Already mentioned in the 2001/2003 PEAP PP, division of labour in 
Uganda has achieved international visibility as a result of the UJAS process which helped 
shaping a basis for discussing and implementing a more efficient donor complementarity. In 
2005, the UJAS invited donors to “critically self-assess their comparative advantages” (UJAS 
2005, 16), while also acknowledging that “the issue of who decides who has the comparative 
advantage in any given area was difficult to address” and “disengaging from sectors proved 
difficult for many UJAS partners” (UJAS 2005, viii).  
Further steps on improved donor complementarity were taken by Uganda in 2006. Supported 
by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and as part of attempts to implement the Paris 
Declaration to local conditions, the government and the Local Development Partner Group, 
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conducted  a “development partner division of labour” exercise. The starting point of this was 
to to map aid flows against the governments own efforts (budget and PEAP) and facilitate the 
self-assessment of “past, current and future activities in the context of the PEAP” (Republic of 
Uganda 2006). It also included peer-reviewed self-assessment of comparative advantages of 
each donor in terms of “particular characteristics for a development partner leading on some 
aspect” at the sector level (ODI 2006; see details below). Although 29 donors returned 
completed questionnaires, the process lost momentum “temporally” in 2007, partly due to the 
focus on donor harmonisation and a subsequent lack of consistent country leadership 
(Republic of Uganda 2008, 33). Another possible caveat was the design of the comparative 
advantages which some bilateral donors perceived as “irrational” reflecting only existing 
operational and financial strength at the sector level (Afrodad 2007, 24). In general, two 
limitations arose from the first phase of the division of labour exercise: the need for breaking 
down division of labour in each sector and the more rational distribution of donors among 
sectors under the leadership of the government. 
The government and particularly the Ministry of Finance is committed to launching a second 
phase of the division of labour exercise, which should inform the updated version of the 
UJAS, currently under preparation. A renewed impetus may emerge from Uganda’s role as a 
co-chair of the WP-EFF’s task team on division of labour and its participation in the FTDoL 
of the European Union. 
Emerging criteria for donor concentration 
At this stage, the debate on division of labour in Uganda is focussed merely on in-country 
complementarity among donors. To the extent that the exercise in 2006 and 2007 was rather 
donor-driven, question marks arise around the necessity to foster country leadership and to 
understand doubts and reservations of the government regarding a possible lack of funding at 
the sector level and the actual conditions for the government to decide on donors’ 
comparative advantages and subsequently assign areas of work. 
Within these limitations, the following criteria emerge from the division of labour exercise 
(based on ODI 2006): 
— Headquarter and decentralisation: Capability of taking operational and political 
decisions with a strong support by HQ 
— Financing and systems alignment: Level, modalities, flexibility and alignment of 
development funding, predictability, and experience in programme-based aid 
— Dialogue, credibility and historical record: Dialogue and negotiation skills, 
credibility with national organisms and number of years in a sector 
— Staffing and capacity: sector expertise, process management, networks and working 
relations 
These criteria already draw a quite clear picture on a possible reinterpretation for geographic 
donor concentration since they relate to the overall capacity of a certain donor to contribute 
high-quality aid and a good behaviour in terms of dialogue and negotiation. Additionally, 
both the 2001/2003 Partnership Principles and the UJAS offers some directions on deepening 
the understanding of country-led criteria such as: 
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— A clear preference and capability to provide general budget support 
— The willingness and ability to foster analytical work and policy analysis in order to 
rapidly achieve PEAP goals 
— Flexibility and capacity to respond to emerging national needs 
— Active involvement in sector coordination and the overall harmonisation agenda 
(policy dialogue aid, missions, studies, etc.) 
Beyond aid and development relations, Uganda still has not developed broader criteria, for 
example in terms of commercial and investment relations. As the country is moving towards 
the exploitation of natural resources, a bid for more policy coherence at the donor countries’ 
side might become more relevant in the future. 
5.3 Summary: What can be derived from country-led processes 
— Thus far, even very committed partner countries have been adopting a rather prudent 
approach towards international division of labour for several reasons. Among these are 
the lack of consistent progress in in-country division of labour, the donor-driven 
character of division of labour, the fear of losing development funding, the 
sensitiveness of aid as central part of foreign relations, and the desire to manage 
diversity can be highlighted. However, even LDC such as Cambodia and Malawi are 
already affected by phasing out as part of ongoing geographical concentration processes 
of donors such as Canada, Sweden and UK. This exemplifies the urgent need of partner 
countries to overcome their rather passive role in the face of phasing-out at the country 
level and position themselves in a more structured dialogue with the donors at the 
global level. 
— In all cases, clear criteria have emerged from the national context of promoting donor 
harmonisation in general and in-country division of labour in particular. Thus, a clear 
connection between in-country and international division of labour seems more than 
plausible for partner countries. Financial weight of a donor is a minor variable, which is 
an important finding for the ongoing discussion, thus far based almost exclusively on 
quantitative analysis of aid volumes and fragmentation. What matters for aid-dependent 
partner countries is the modality rather than the volume. In this sense, Malawi and 
Uganda have expressed their clear preference for general budget support. More 
relevance is giving to qualitative criteria, which are especially explicit regarding the 
capacities and commitment of donors to perform in accordance to the partnership 
paradigm reflected in the Paris Declaration and the AAA. One essential common 
parameter is found in the actual commitment to the aid effectiveness agenda, 
particularly regarding aid coordination, budget support and alignment (use of country 
systems). Apart from more operational issues such as staffing and expertise, also 
“softer” faculties such as trust, risk-taking, dialogue skills and credibility are essential 
for partner countries to assess donors’ performance. 
— In all cases donors are assessed against aspects related to aid delivery and partnership 
relations, but broader dimensions, such as policy coherence for development (PCD), do 
not yet form part of the reflections on the comparative advantages of donors. The case 
of Cambodia shows that PCD could become more important in the future, especially in 
view of the growing desire of partner countries to end aid dependency. 
— In none of the cases, partner countries have used comparative assessments of donor 
countries’ performance. Available data, such as the Commitment to Development Index 
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of the Center for Global Development, the donor performance in the monitoring 
surveys on the Paris Declaration or the World Bank Governance Indicators were not 
used.33 
— Consultation and mutual learning among partner countries has not taken place so far, 
limiting the capacity to analyse and review the broader (cross-country) processes of 
donor concentration. This applies also to the countries participating in the EU Fast 
Track Initiative on Division of Labour. 
— While the debate on in-country division of labour is generally embedded in a more or 
less clear policy environment, international donor complementarity is still not addressed 
in a structured way at the country level. The lack of strategic orientations and dialogue 
platforms for discussing and analysing the geographical concentration of donors thus 
far seems to restrict severely the engagement of partner countries in international 
division of labour. 
6 Conclusions: Next steps for the dialogue on international division of labour 
Choosing an international partner will necessarily be based on a range of criteria, both for 
donors and for aid recipient. For instance, the urge not to alienate powerful international 
actors, or other strategic considerations, often not even originating in the realm of 
development orientation, will be part of the equation for both sides. However, the use of 
indices is a way of informing and substantiating decisions on the basis of criteria comparative 
advantages. The choice of criteria is thereby made more transparent and being made more 
open for political debate between donors and partner countries. This will presumable have to 
start at the level of what development policy is meant to be about, i.e. which indicator is most 
suitable to capture the poverty focus, the supportive role of donors, etc. For political processes 
– such as the selection of one or the other international partner – these indices are generally 
not a mechanistic or static tool, nor should they become one. Indices clearly cannot replace 
political decisions, but can orientate them within a broader framework of global development 
partnership. In other words, the use of solid data would not only lead to the ultimate political 
choice being more soundly based than just “hindsight”, but potentially embed international 
division of labour in the partnership paradigm underlying the Paris Declaration and the Accra 
Agenda for Action. 
The mapping and review of donor- and country-led criteria for international division of labour 
reflect vividly the key challenges for an equitable donor-partner dialogue. However, the 
comparison of the criteria used also sheds some light on the opportunities to create a stronger 
basis for the future global consultations on geographical donor concentration. 
The cases discussed show that international division of labour is faced by the following 
structural caveats: 
— Donors pursue geographical concentration as part of their sovereign foreign policy 
agenda, which, while being legitimate, tends to enter in contradictions with the aid 
                                                 
33  Partner countries might be interested in the political processes and institutions of a certain donor country. A 
study drawing on the voice and accountability variable of the World Bank Indicators and the Commitment 
to Development Index found a strong correlation between the democratic quality of a donor and his 
engagement in promoting development. For more details, see Faust (2007). 
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effectiveness agenda which claims for a global dialogue (and ultimately negotiations) 
among donors as well as between donors and partners. 
— Partner countries still regard international division of labour primarily as a threat to 
funding levels and desirable diversity in policy options emerging from aid relations. 
This perceived menace is being addressed in a rather cautious, even passive way. 
However, donor concentration also affects (even more sensitively) the foreign policy 
agenda of partner countries. 
— Thus far, division of labour has been implemented foremost at the country level, 
leading to a rather case-to-case assessment of the progresses, without having shaped 
mechanisms for mutual learning. Furthermore, the lack of institutionalisation of 
geographical donor concentration has led to a very weak basis for negotiations, 
consultations and exchange of experiences, particularly among partner countries. 
A quick comparison of the criteria used by donors and partner countries leads to the following 
conclusions: 
— When deciding on geographical concentration, donor countries usually draw on several 
compacts of formal criteria which assess the needs, absorption capacity and governance 
at the partner country side, as well as the contribution of the donor to the development 
of a certain developing country. Partner country characteristics are generally evaluated 
on the basis of existing indices. For their own comparative advantage, however, donors 
seem to have introduced more political discretion in the decision-making process. 
— Partner countries tend to use criteria related to the commitment and capacities of a 
donor to advance in the aid effectiveness commitments, as well as (often rather 
neglected) aspects of partnership, such as trust, credibility or dialogue skills. While 
these qualitative parameters are assessed by each partner country individually, thus far 
there is no experience of using comparative data or rankings on donor performance. In 
contrast, for LDCs, aid volume as such plays a less dominant role than might have been 
expected, although certain modalities, particularly general budget support, appear to be 
the preferred option. 
— In consequence, donors tend to use more solid data in selecting partner countries, which 
might be partly explained by the availability of various official and independent 
rankings classifying developing countries. Partner countries are more restricted in the 
comparative analysis of donors and have not yet draw on the more fragmented analysis 
of standards for donor performance in aid effectiveness or policy coherence. 
— At a more general level, geographic donor concentration is still lacking mirrors of 
mutual assessment, particularly at the donor side. The classification of donor 
performance, e.g. on the basis of comparative advantages, is still incipient and 
fragmented, which also illustrates the multiple shortcomings in international mutual 
accountability (cf. Droop / Isenman /Mlalzi 2008). Though, for a consistent debate on 
how donors should deploy among partner contries in the future, it is necessary to 
deepen the understanding of a donor’s contributions, along with the analysis of the 
conditions of the receiving partner country. 
International division of labour needs to take into account the overall partnership paradigm 
underlying the aid effectiveness agenda and should thus be led by qualitative criteria of both 
donors and partners, apart from the more quantitative assessment of financial fragmentation. 
With an eye toward the donor-partner dialogue requested by the AAA, the following 
preliminary recommendations arise from the mapping and analysis of criteria for international 
division of labour: 
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Table 1: Comparing country versus donor led criteria 
Country-led criteria Donor-led criteria 
Funding, including volume, predictability and 
budget support (all) 
Commitment to aid effectiveness (all) 
Trust, credibility and political dialogue (all) 
Institutional capacity (Cambodia, Uganda) 
Flexibility and risk-taking (Cambodia and Uganda) 
Need and poverty (all) 
Aid effectiveness (all) 
Previous linkages and regional agenda (all) 
Donor added value (all) 
Governance (Germany and Sweden) 
Common values and interests (Germany) 
 
— Peer learning on criteria for international division of labour is a pending task for 
partner countries. In a first step it is paramount to foster the perspectives of partner 
countries on possible variables for donor deployment. In accordance to the overall 
dynamic of the implementation of the AAA, country experience and perspectives 
should be at the forefront of the efforts on international division of labour. Specifically, 
country-level workshops using creative tools could build scenarios for donor selection 
(see also section 5.1). Furthermore, partner countries could discuss and share their 
criteria at the regional level and promote South-South learning regarding international 
division of labour (for example, through existing Community of Practices). In this 
context, existing indices should be further adapted and guided towards standards for 
donor performance and practice. In sum, these tasks should contribute to a clear partner 
country perspective on international division of labour with the DAC task team as the 
only platform thus far available for assessing and taking decisions on geographic donor 
deployment.  
— Communication among donors has also a wide margin for improvement and should 
be enhanced at the European and DAC level. Information and analysis of ongoing 
concentration processes in different donor countries, such as Canada, Sweden and the 
UK should be disseminated transparently in order to draw a clear image of the shifting 
distribution of donors across developing countries. Mutual learning and peer review of 
donor-led criteria for geographical concentration could be fostered within the task team 
on division of labour at the DAC. 
— The use of criteria for the donor-partner dialogue on international division of labour 
should create synergies with the emerging international mutual accountability and its 
various “mirrors” of mutual assessment. Especially the assessment of donor 
contributions should be strengthened in the multilateral arena. Given that aid 
effectiveness (and overall aid quality) is one of the core priorities for partner countries, 
a comparative analysis of the donor data of the Paris Declaration monitoring survey 
might be an interesting point of entry. 
— In order to ensure a consistent and equitable debate on this broader dimension of 
division of labour, the donor-partner dialogue should be pursued in coordination 
between the DAC task team and the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) at the 
ECOSOC. Specifically, both the task team technical meeting in Paris (in November 
2009) the task team kick-off workshop in Pretoria (in February 2010) should take  
into account the results and recommendations of the High-Level Symposium on Mutual 
Accountability of the DCF (on 11-13 November 2009). The shift of platforms would 
benefit from a pragmatic, non-exclusive approach of merging the task team’s technical 
capacities and DCF’s political legitimacy, for example by including DCF repres-
entatives actively in the task team work. 
—  
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Annex I: Partner countries of German development cooperation since 2008  
 
Bilateral development cooperation in the context of country programmes 
 
Region Partner Country 
Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, 
Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam 
South Eastern 
Europe / 
Caucasus 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine 
Latin America 
and the Carribean 
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Columbia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru 
North Africa / 
Middle East 
Egypt, Yemen, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Syria 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Ethiopia, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, D. R. 
Congo, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Zambia, Senegal, Sudan (southern Sudan), South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda 
 
 
Bilateral development cooperation in the context of regional / thematic programmes 
 
Region Partner Country 
Asia Timor Leste, Philippines, Sri Lanka 
South Eastern  
Europe / Caucasus 
Caucasus Initiative (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), Moldova 
Latin America and the 
Carribean 
Carribean Programme (Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba), Costa Rica,  
El Salvador, Paraguay 
North Africa / Middle East Jordan, Tunisia, Lebanon, Algeria 
Sub-Saharan Africa Fragile States in West Africa programme (Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Guinea, inter alia) 
Source: http://www.bmz.bund.de/en/countries/partnercountries/laenderkonzentration/tabelle_neu.html  
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Annex II: Priority countries of Swedish development cooperation after implementing  
its new focused bilateral development cooperation 
 
Long-term development cooperation (12) 
Africa Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia 
Asia Bangladesh, Cambodia 
Latin America Bolivia 
 
 
Countries in conflict and/or post-conflict situations (12) 
Africa Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Sudan 
Asia Afghanistan, Timor-Leste 
The Middle East Iraq, West Bank-Gaza 
Latin America Colombia, Guatemala 
 
 
Reform cooperation with countries in Eastern Europe (9) 
Europe Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine 
Source: http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/08/66/21/496f32e6.pdf 
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Annex III: Ranking and final choice of priority countries of the Czech Republic for 
the period 2006-2010 
 
 
Country Priority  
2003-2005 
Points Priority  
2006-2010 
“Project country” 
since 2008 
Ethiopia Yes 36  Yes 
Yemen  Yes 30 Yes  
Angola  Yes 29 Yes  
Vietnam Yes 28 Yes  
Mongolia  Yes 27 Yes  
Mali  Yes 23   
Afghanistan  Yes 20 Mid-term Yes 
Burkina Faso Yes 20   
Uzbekistan  Yes 19   
Ukraine  Yes 18   
Bosnia-Herzegovina  Yes 17 Yes  
Serbia (ex-Yugoslavia)  Yes 17 Yes  
Nicaragua Yes 17   
Kazakhstan Yes 16   
Bolivia Yes 15   
Lebanon  Yes 15   
Palestine  Yes 10  Yes 
Namibia  Yes 8   
El Salvador  Yes 8   
Macedonia Yes 6   
Moldova  - Yes  
Zambia  - Yes  
Iraq  - Mid-term  Yes 
Cambodia  -  Yes 
Kosovo  -  Yes 
Georgia  -  De facto 
Source: FoRS (2007, 22) 
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